A logistics corporation is consolidating its IT operations across multiple acquired subsidiaries by deploying a multi-account landing zone using AWS Organizations. The security team is setting up direct SAML 2.0-based identity federation to target accounts, bypassing AWS IAM Identity Center due to custom legacy attribute mapping requirements from an on-premises Shibboleth Identity Provider (IdP). During pilot testing, users receive access denied errors immediately after selecting their role on the AWS federation portal. Analysis reveals that the federated roles are configured with session tags for Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC), but the tags are not being evaluated, and user sessions are expiring too quickly for long-running database maintenance tasks.
Which of the following configuration steps must the solutions architect perform to successfully resolve these federation and session lifecycle issues? (Select TWO.)
- In the target IAM roles, update the trust policy to allow both 'sts:AssumeRoleWithSAML' and 'sts:TagSession' actions for the federated SAML provider principal, and configure the Shibboleth IdP to release SAML attributes mapped to the 'https://aws.amazon.com/SAML/Attributes/PrincipalTag:' namespace.Answer
- Increase the 'Maximum CLI/API session duration' setting on the target IAM roles up to 12 hours, and configure the Shibboleth IdP to include the 'https://aws.amazon.com/SAML/Attributes/SessionDuration' attribute in the SAML assertion.Answer
- CAttach a Service Control Policy (SCP) at the root of the AWS Organization that explicitly allows the 'sts:AssumeRoleWithSAML' and 'sts:TagSession' actions, ensuring the policy overrides local IAM role trust policy limitations.
- DUpdate the target IAM roles' trust policies to trust the AWS Organizations management account root principal, and delegate the SAML provider configuration and 'sts:AssumeRoleWithSAML' actions entirely to the centralized identity account.