An enterprise network experiences an internal security incident where an unauthorized host on access VLAN 10 poisons the ARP caches of adjacent endpoints by advertising its own MAC address as the default gateway. A network engineer must implement a Layer 2 mitigation strategy that intercepts, inspects, and validates ARP requests and responses against a trusted IP-to-MAC binding table built by DHCP snooping. Which security mechanism directly mitigates this threat?
- Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI), which checks ARP packets on untrusted ports against the DHCP snooping binding database to discard spoofed ARP replies.Answer
- BPort Security with sticky MAC address learning enabled across switch trunk links to restrict invalid gateway frame propagation.
- CStandard IPv4 Access Control Lists (ACLs) applied inbound on the switch virtual interface (SVI) without explicit deny entries.
- DRADIUS authentication on switch access ports, which encrypts Layer 2 ARP payloads to prevent host spoofing.
Answer
Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI), which checks ARP packets on untrusted ports against the DHCP snooping binding database to discard spoofed ARP replies.
Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) is a Layer 2 security feature that defends against ARP poisoning and spoofing attacks. When DAI is enabled on a VLAN, switch ports are designated as trusted or untrusted. DAI intercepts all ARP requests and responses on untrusted ports and verifies the IP-to-MAC address bindings against a database built by DHCP snooping. If the ARP packet contains invalid or spoofed mappings, DAI drops the packet.
Step-by-Step Solution
Key Concept
Mitigating Layer 2 ARP Poisoning Threats using Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) and DHCP Snooping