An enterprise API gateway receives automated configuration updates from external vendors. To satisfy auditing requirements, security policies dictate that the system must establish indisputable proof of origin for every payload, ensuring vendors cannot deny sending a specific update. The system architects propose utilizing SHA-256 hashing paired with pre-shared symmetric keys (HMAC) between the gateway and each vendor. Which security goal remains unfulfilled by this proposed architecture, and why?
- Non-repudiation, because symmetric shared keys allow either the sender or receiver to generate a valid message authentication code, preventing third-party proof of origin.Answer
- BIntegrity, because hashing with shared keys verifies network transmission paths rather than payload consistency.
- CAuthorization, because cryptographic message digests assign system privileges rather than validating payload authenticity.
- DConfidentiality, because asymmetric encryption algorithms are required to obfuscate data contents during transit.
Answer
Non-repudiation remains unfulfilled because symmetric pre-shared keys allow either party possessing the key to create a valid HMAC, preventing proof of payload origin to a third-party auditor.
Non-repudiation requires unforgeable proof of origin that can be verified by a third party. Because symmetric HMAC relies on a secret key known to both the sender and the receiver, either party can compute the valid hash. Therefore, the vendor can plausibly claim the receiver generated the hash, failing non-repudiation. Asymmetric digital signatures (private key signing) are required to achieve non-repudiation.
Step-by-Step Solution
Key Concept
Non-repudiation vs. Integrity in Cryptographic Mechanisms
Estimated Time:1m 30s