Question

Difficulty: HardCryptographic and Security Control Weaknesses

An aerospace engineering enterprise recently completed a third-party technical audit of its internal infrastructure. Match each security weakness scenario on the left with the corresponding cryptographic or control vulnerability on the right.

  • An internal portal encrypts session tokens using AES-CBC without a message authentication code, permitting unauthorized modification of encrypted payload flags.Bit-flipping vulnerability caused by unauthenticated cipher mode usage
  • An IoT gateway uses a single pre-installed asymmetric key pair compiled directly into firmware across 10,000 deployed field sensors.Improper key management resulting in private key reuse across endpoints
  • A firmware update distribution server verifies binary signatures using SHA-1 digest comparisons.Hash collision vulnerability inherent to deprecated digest algorithms
  • A legacy VPN gateway supports 512-bit Diffie-Hellman groups during TLS key agreement negotiations.Weak key exchange implementation vulnerable to decryption via low key length parameters

Answer

Each scenario correctly pairs with its underlying vulnerability: the unauthenticated AES-CBC portal matches the bit-flipping vulnerability; the firmware with identical keys matches key reuse from improper key management; SHA-1 signature verification matches the hash collision vulnerability; and 512-bit Diffie-Hellman negotiation matches weak key exchange implementation.
The correct pairings align each operational scenario with its underlying technical failure: CBC mode without MAC enables ciphertext bit manipulation; shared embedded keys breach isolation principles through key reuse; SHA-1 signature checks are susceptible to collision attacks; and 512-bit DH groups fail to withstand parameter cracking.

Step-by-Step Solution

1
Analyze the session token scenario using AES-CBC without MAC.
Identified bit-flipping vulnerability from unauthenticated cipher mode usage.
Without authentication tags (e.g., HMAC), CBC ciphertext bits can be modified by an adversary to predictably manipulate plaintext values upon decryption.
2
Evaluate the IoT firmware deployment containing a shared key pair.
Identified improper key management resulting in private key reuse.
Hardcoding and reusing a single private key across thousands of endpoints compromises all devices if a single unit is extracted and reverse-engineered.
3
Review the firmware update server using SHA-1 for signature validation.
Identified hash collision vulnerability inherent to deprecated digest algorithms.
SHA-1 is cryptographically broken due to practical collision attacks, allowing forged software binaries to pass verification.
4
Examine the VPN gateway accepting 512-bit Diffie-Hellman parameters.
Identified weak key exchange implementation with low parameter length.
512-bit DH key exchange parameters do not provide adequate work factor security and permit attackers to precompute discrete logs to recover session keys.

Key Concept

Identification and remediation of cryptographic protocol weaknesses and security control flaws
Estimated Time:2m 0s
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