A security operations center analyst receives a high-severity alert from a network security monitoring system watching a dedicated deception host (honeypot) located inside a monitored subnet segment. The alert logs multiple inbound connection attempts on TCP port 22 originating from an external IP address. The analyst immediately submits an emergency change request to reconfigure the honeypot host's local firewall to block port 22 incoming traffic to mitigate the risk of compromise. Which of the following best evaluates the analyst's action?
- The analyst's action is flawed because honeypots are designed to attract and observe unauthorized activity, and blocking traffic prevents intelligence gathering.Answer
- BThe analyst's action is correct because honeypots should be reclassified as inline preventive controls whenever active probe alerts trigger.
- CThe analyst should have initiated automated host isolation playbooks across all internal production domain controllers instead of modifying the host.
- DThe analyst failed to recognize that port 22 connection attempts in NIDS logs indicate false positive alerts generated by standard HTTPS web browsing.
Answer
The analyst's action is flawed because honeypots are designed to attract and observe unauthorized activity, and blocking traffic prevents intelligence gathering.
The correct answer highlights that a honeypot is a deception control specifically built to attract unauthorized network interactions to study adversary tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). Applying inline block rules directly on the honeypot prevents analysts from gathering security intelligence and defeats the system's purpose.
Step-by-Step Solution
Key Concept
Honeypot Alerting and Deception Technology Monitoring
Estimated Time:1m 30s