An organization is configuring a shared Linux host operating system to execute unmanaged containerized microservices for multiple untrusted third parties. The security team must minimize the attack surface of the shared host kernel and prevent one tenant's containerized process from inspecting or interacting with processes of another tenant. Which TWO of the following mechanisms directly accomplish these security goals?
- Configure Linux kernel namespaces to restrict process IDs, mount points, and network interface visibility between container environments.Answer
- Implement custom seccomp (secure computing mode) filters to restrict the set of system calls available to running container processes.Answer
- CRely on container layer read-only filesystems to provide hardware-level execution ring isolation between tenant workloads.
- DDeploy stateful network perimeter firewalls at the cloud edge to prevent containers from exploiting host kernel memory flaws.
Answer
The correct mechanisms are configuring Linux kernel namespaces to restrict process IDs, mount points, and network interface visibility, and implementing custom seccomp filters to restrict system calls executed on the host kernel.
Configuring Linux kernel namespaces isolates process IDs, network stacks, and mount points across containers so tenant workloads cannot view each other's environments. Applying seccomp profiles restricts the syscalls container processes can make to the host kernel, preventing malicious or unneeded syscalls from compromising the host operating system.
Step-by-Step Solution
Key Concept
Kernel Namespaces and Seccomp Profiles for Container Host Hardening