A media streaming company structures its Google Cloud resource hierarchy into an Organization node with environment folders, including a dedicated Production-Workloads folder and a separate Tools-and-CI project. An automated CI/CD pipeline running on a Compute Engine instance in the Tools-and-CI project uses a dedicated deployment Service Account to manage application compute instances inside projects under the Production-Workloads folder. Developers need to trigger builds that execute deployment tasks through this pipeline, but security governance requires enforcing least privilege while preventing developers from altering the deployment Service Account policy or accessing production instances directly. How should IAM roles and resource hierarchy bindings be configured to meet these requirements?
- Grant the Compute Instance Admin (v1) role to the deployment Service Account at the Production-Workloads folder level, and grant the Service Account User role on the deployment Service Account to the developer group at the Tools-and-CI project level.Answer
- BGrant the primitive Editor role to the deployment Service Account at the Organization node level, and grant the primitive Viewer role to the developer group at the Production-Workloads folder level.
- CGrant the Compute Instance Admin (v1) role to the deployment Service Account at the Production-Workloads folder level, and grant the Service Account Admin role on the deployment Service Account to the developer group.
- DGrant the Compute Admin role to the deployment Service Account at the Production-Workloads folder level, relying exclusively on IAM resource hierarchy bindings to prevent automated pipeline instances from copying sensitive data to unauthorized external Cloud Storage buckets.