Question

Passage A
The persistence of string theory as the dominant paradigm in high-energy physics, despite an ongoing absence of empirical verification, has prompted some philosophers of science to call for an epistemological paradigm shift. Proponents of this shift argue that the traditional Popperian requirement of strict empirical falsifiability is too restrictive for modern theoretical physics. Instead, they advocate for "non-empirical theory assessment." This framework suggests that a theory's validity can be established through its unexpected explanatory coherence—its ability to elegantly resolve disparate physical problems it was not originally constructed to address—and the sheer lack of viable theoretical alternatives. When a theory exhibits unprecedented mathematical consistency and unites quantum mechanics with general relativity, demanding immediate empirical confirmation is anachronistic. Indeed, the methodological rigidity of strict falsifiability artificially constrains scientific progress, ignoring how theoretical virtues themselves provide robust confirmation of a theory's truth-tracking capability.

Passage B
The recent trend among some theoretical physicists to elevate mathematical beauty and internal consistency to the status of scientific proof is a troubling departure from the scientific method. At the heart of this movement is a desire to insulate highly speculative frameworks, most notably string theory, from their persistent failure to yield testable predictions. However, the demarcation between empirical science and pure mathematics relies precisely on the capacity for physical observation to refute theoretical models. To suggest that a theory is "too elegant to be wrong" is to abandon physics for aesthetics. History is replete with mathematically flawless frameworks that ultimately failed to describe physical reality. While theoretical coherence is a necessary condition for a scientific theory, it can never be a sufficient one. Without the anchor of empirical falsifiability, physics risks devolving into a discipline where consensus is driven by sociological factors and subjective mathematical preferences rather than objective reality. Relaxing empirical standards does not advance science; it merely redefines it to obscure failure.

Based on the passages, the authors would be most likely to DISAGREE over the truth of which of the following statements?