Question

The following dual passages discuss the relationship between international and domestic law.

Passage A
The relationship between international and domestic law has historically been analyzed through the monist perspective, a theoretical framework which posits that both spheres form a single, unified legal system. In this view, international law is not merely a set of pragmatic, horizontal agreements negotiated among sovereign states, but rather a supreme, overarching legal order that directly binds domestic courts and institutions. Monists argue that when a nation formally ratifies an international treaty, its provisions should ideally confer actionable rights and enforceable obligations upon individuals. These rights should be immediately enforceable by local judges without the prerequisite of additional legislative action. However, modern monist scholars frequently concede that this theoretical ideal is substantially complicated by practical political and legal realities on the ground. For instance, they readily acknowledge that certain international agreements are drafted so broadly—often utilizing sweeping, aspirational language to secure diplomatic consensus—that they are inherently non-self-executing. In such complex instances, even within a monist framework, domestic courts absolutely require the national legislature to enact specific, detailed statutes to provide a workable, concrete framework for judicial enforcement. Furthermore, monists recognize that sovereign states maintain strict procedural autonomy, meaning that the institutional and administrative machinery of domestic courts remains entirely independent, irrespective of the international origins of the substantive law being applied. Additionally, monist legal theory views customary international law—the unwritten, established practices of nations—as an intrinsic, organic part of the domestic legal fabric, seamlessly guiding and shaping domestic judicial interpretation without prior legislative adoption.

Passage B
Dualism offers a contrasting and arguably more pragmatic paradigm, treating international law and domestic law as two entirely distinct, independent, and parallel legal spheres. According to traditional dualist theory, international law strictly and exclusively regulates the diplomatic relations and formal obligations among sovereign states on the global stage, while domestic law exclusively governs the behavior of individuals and entities within a specific nation's borders. Because these two legal systems operate on fundamentally different planes, an international treaty inherently possesses no direct internal legal effect unless it is formally and explicitly incorporated into domestic law through a deliberate legislative act by the state's governing body. Without this crucial step of legal translation, domestic judges possess no jurisdiction to invoke or enforce the treaty's provisions. Nevertheless, modern dualist jurisprudence recognizes certain unavoidable practical intersections between these dual spheres. Dualist scholars broadly accept that when incorporating treaties, national legislators must frequently construct highly detailed domestic statutes that meticulously render a treaty's broad, diplomatic ambitions into precise, actionable rules that local courts can actually apply. Moreover, dualists concede that customary international law—particularly those fundamental norms universally recognized by civilized nations over centuries—often serves as a vital interpretative guide for domestic courts, particularly when existing national statutes are ambiguous or silent on an issue. Finally, despite their heavy emphasis on the rigid separation of legal systems, dualist scholars universally agree that the ultimate enforcement and administration of any incorporated international law relies entirely on the established administrative and procedural mechanisms of the sovereign state's own domestic judiciary.

Based on the passages, match each assertion derived from Passage A with the corresponding point of agreement found in Passage B.