Question

In nineteenth-century German legal theory, Rudolf von Jhering formulated the doctrine of *culpa in contrahendo* to address an institutional gap in classical contract law: the plight of parties who suffered reliance losses during preliminary negotiations when the prospective agreement ultimately proved void ab initio due to an unrecognized formal defect or mistake. Under prevailing Pandectist doctrine, contractual remedies required an existing, fully executed agreement, while delictual (tort) remedies strictly demanded the violation of an absolute, pre-existing right such as bodily integrity or tangible property. Consequently, pre-contractual negligence that induced justifiable but futile expenditures remained legally unredressable. Jhering posited that entering into contractual negotiations creates a distinct quasi-contractual relationship that imposes an implied duty of mutual diligence and good faith, independent of whether a binding contract actually materializes. Thus, a party who negligently creates an erroneous appearance of contractual validity is liable for the other's reliance interest (the negative interest), restoring them to the position they would have occupied had negotiations never commenced, though not for expectation damages (the positive interest). Modern civil codes widely adopted this construct, but Anglo-American common law jurisdictions long resisted recognizing an overarching duty of good faith in pre-contractual bargaining, relying instead on piecemeal equitable doctrines like promissory estoppel or fraudulent misrepresentation, largely out of a commitment to market individualism and the apprehension that an amorphous pre-contractual duty would stifle commercial flexibility.

Based on the passage, which of the following can most reasonably be inferred about why a plaintiff under nineteenth-century Pandectist doctrine could not successfully bring a delictual (tort) claim to recover futile expenditures incurred during negotiations for a void contract?