Question

The principle of *uti possidetis juris* (UPJ) was originally applied during the nineteenth-century decolonization of Latin America to preserve the administrative boundaries established by the Spanish Empire as the international borders for newly independent states. This doctrine was later explicitly adopted by African states in the mid-twentieth century to preempt fratricidal territorial disputes upon achieving independence. However, contemporary legal scholars debate whether UPJ constitutes a universal customary international law or remains a regional *lex specialis*.

Proponents of universality argue that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) elevated UPJ to a universal norm in the *Frontier Dispute* case, asserting that the principle is logically connected to the phenomenon of state succession regardless of geographic location. Critics counter that the ICJ’s pronouncement was overbroad. They point out that during the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the Badinter Arbitration Commission awkwardly imposed UPJ to freeze internal federal borders into international frontiers—a context fundamentally different from overseas decolonization.

These critics maintain that mechanically applying UPJ outside the colonial context strips the doctrine of its original rationale: balancing the right to self-determination against the existential threat of territorial fragmentation. Consequently, in non-colonial secessions, the rigid imposition of UPJ can paradoxically exacerbate the very ethnic conflicts it was designed to forestall, as the inherited borders often ignore localized demographic realities, binding historically antagonistic groups within artificial legal confines.

Based on the passage, which one of the following can be most reasonably inferred regarding the Badinter Arbitration Commission’s application of the doctrine of *uti possidetis juris*?