Question

The following dual passages discuss the philosophical foundations of intellectual property law.

Passage A
The architectural framework of modern Anglo-American copyright is fundamentally utilitarian, designed primarily to serve the overarching public interest rather than to confer inherent moral entitlements upon creators. From its conceptual inception, the rationale for granting authors exclusive rights to their works has not been to reward them intrinsically for their intellectual labor, nor to recognize a natural property right derived from creation itself. Rather, the system is engineered to incentivize the continuous production of new knowledge, scientific discoveries, and cultural artifacts. The underlying economic logic is straightforward and highly pragmatic: absent the temporary monopoly provided by copyright protection, creators would struggle to recoup their significant initial investments of time, capital, and intellectual resources, as free-riding competitors could simply duplicate the finished work at a marginal cost of zero. This market failure would inevitably precipitate a severe underproduction of creative works, to the profound detriment of society as a whole. Consequently, the legal restriction on the public's ability to freely reproduce, adapt, and distribute these works is a calculated, pragmatic concession. A short-term limitation on immediate communal access is accepted as the necessary price for cultivating a richer, more diverse, and more dynamic public domain in the long term. In this paradigm, authorial rights are strictly instrumental; they exist only insofar as they function as the most efficient mechanism for promoting broad cultural and scientific advancement.

Passage B
To conceptualize intellectual property merely as a utilitarian policy lever for maximizing public welfare is to profoundly misconstrue the fundamental ontology of creative authorship. Within the Continental *droit d'auteur* (author's right) tradition, deeply rooted in Hegelian philosophy, an intellectual creation is recognized not as a fungible economic commodity subject to cost-benefit analysis, but as an intimate, indelible extension of the creator's own personality. The author's prerogative to govern the dissemination, attribution, and structural integrity of their work is therefore framed as a fundamental human right, one that exists wholly independent of any subsequent societal dividend or economic rationale. While enforcing this sovereign right undeniably dictates that the broader society is constrained from freely appropriating or altering the protected expression, this limitation must not be viewed as a "necessary evil" justified by macroeconomic calculation or future cultural yields. Rather, it is the essential mechanism through which a civilized legal system respects individual agency and protects the sanctity of personhood. The public’s desire for unhindered access to the work is distinctly secondary to the author’s primary, organic bond with their creation. Thus, even if a given creative work never yields a measurable benefit to the public at large—or indeed, even if the author chooses to selfishly withhold it from the public entirely—the creator’s inherent authority to dictate its usage remains absolute and inviolable.

Based on the passages, match each statement regarding intellectual property (1-4) to the classification that best describes its textual support (A-D).