Question

Read the following passage regarding the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

The protracted negotiations of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) were fundamentally shaped by the competing interests of distinct geopolitical coalitions, each delineating explicit boundaries to their diplomatic concessions. The Group of 77 (G-77), a bloc of developing nations, championed the deep seabed as the 'common heritage of mankind.' While demonstrating significant flexibility regarding transit passage through international straits, the G-77 adamantly refused any compromise—with the sole exception of minor delays in technology transfer—on the establishment of a supranational Enterprise empowered to unilaterally control seabed mining revenues. Conversely, the traditional Maritime Powers prioritized global naval mobility. They were broadly amenable to the expansion of coastal state jurisdiction via Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), but their absolute red line was the freedom of navigation; they were least willing to accept any framework that subjected military vessels to mandatory coastal state notification or authorization requirements. Operating from a position of geographic disadvantage, the Landlocked and Geographically Disadvantaged States (LLGDS) sought equitable access to marine wealth. They conceded on the vast jurisdictional expansion of coastal states, yet vehemently opposed any regime that excluded their right to participate, on a non-discriminatory basis, in the exploitation of the living biological resources within the EEZs of neighboring nations. Finally, the Archipelagic Nations sought recognition of sovereign rights over waters connecting their island territories. Although they guaranteed innocent passage for foreign vessels, they uniformly rejected any formulation that failed to explicitly classify archipelagic waters as possessing a higher degree of sovereignty than standard international straits.

Based explicitly on the text, match each geopolitical coalition to the specific policy concession it was LEAST willing to make (its primary non-negotiable exception) during the negotiations.