Question

Read the following passage.

Professor Elena Rostova has recently articulated a novel framework for addressing corporate malfeasance, proposing that principles of restorative justice—traditionally confined to interpersonal offenses and juvenile courts—be adapted for the adjudication of corporate crimes. Rostova argues that the conventional retributive model, which relies heavily on punitive fines and deferred prosecution agreements, frequently fails to deter future misconduct because monetary penalties are easily internalized by large corporations as mere costs of doing business. Instead, she advocates for restorative remedies that compel corporate offenders to engage directly with affected communities, thereby fostering structural reforms within the offending entity and repairing the specific social fabric damaged by the corporation’s actions.

At first glance, Rostova’s framework offers a compelling alternative to a system that many legal scholars consider deeply flawed. The conceptual elegance of applying restorative justice to the corporate sphere is undeniable, and her meticulous detailing of how victim-offender dialogues might be structured when the "offender" is a multinational conglomerate is theoretically rigorous. Indeed, by highlighting the limitations of financial penalties and the opacity of deferred prosecutions, she correctly diagnoses the fundamental impotence of the current retributive paradigm.

However, Rostova’s optimism regarding the practical implementation of her model appears disconnected from corporate realities. She significantly underestimates the entrenched bureaucratic resistance within large corporations, assuming a level of institutional introspection that historical precedent simply does not support. Furthermore, while restorative justice relies heavily on the authentic remorse and voluntary accountability of the offender, corporations, as profit-maximizing entities devoid of human conscience, cannot genuinely experience remorse. Rostova attempts to circumvent this philosophical hurdle by suggesting that a corporation's demonstrable commitment to structural reform can serve as a proxy for remorse. Yet, this substitution dilutes the very essence of restorative justice, transforming what is intended to be a profound moral reckoning into a sterile, transactional compliance exercise. Ultimately, while her critique of the status quo is both accurate and necessary, the restorative solution she champions is structurally incompatible with the inherent nature of corporate behavior, rendering her framework a fascinating theoretical exercise rather than a viable blueprint for legal reform.

Based on the passage, the author’s stance toward Rostova’s proposed framework for addressing corporate crimes can best be described as which one of the following?