In nineteenth-century common law jurisprudence, the fellow-servant rule established that an employer could not be held vicariously liable for workplace injuries inflicted on an employee solely through the negligence of a coworker. Articulated in Farwell v. Boston & Worcester Rail Road (1842), the doctrine rested on the theory of an implied contract: courts reasoned that wages in hazardous occupations naturally incorporated a 'risk premium' that compensated workers in advance for ordinary perils, including peer carelessness. Modern legal historians argue, however, that this judicial rationale presumed competitive labor market conditions—such as worker mobility, perfect information regarding workplace hazards, and equal bargaining leverage—that were fundamentally absent during early industrialization. Consequently, the rule effectively shielded emerging industrial enterprises from liability costs while shifting the financial burden of industrial accidents onto the labor force.
Which of the following statements are logically supported by the passage? (Select all that apply.)
- The legal rationale underlying the fellow-servant rule assumed that employees had the practical capacity to negotiate higher pay in exchange for accepting hazardous working conditions.Answer
- BNineteenth-century judicial decisions established that the fellow-servant doctrine applied exclusively to railroad transport while exempting manufacturing factories.
- CThe passage of statutory workers' compensation schemes in the twentieth century directly nullified common law judicial precedents regarding fellow-servant liability.
- The economic justification articulated by nineteenth-century courts for the fellow-servant rule depended on market assumptions that differed from actual industrial labor conditions.Answer
- ENineteenth-century common law courts held employers strictly liable for injuries caused by defective mechanical equipment rather than human coworker error.