Read the following excerpt from a philosophy of mind text:
"To defend physicalism against the 'knowledge argument,' some theorists advance the ability hypothesis. They posit that when a neuroscientist who has lived entirely in a black-and-white room finally sees the color red, she learns no new propositional facts about the universe; rather, she acquires new practical abilities, such as the capacity to recognize, imagine, and remember red. However, reducing phenomenal knowledge strictly to behavioral know-how is vulnerable to critique. Conee, for instance, proposes the case of a person who possesses the complete physical coordination and cognitive scaffolding required to ride a bicycle, yet has never actually ridden one. This person maintains the latent practical ability to ride, yet remains entirely ignorant of the subjective phenomenal experience—the 'what it is like'—of riding a bicycle. Consequently, the subjective character of conscious experience cannot be exhaustively described by an inventory of functional capacities."
Evaluate the following statement:
In the context of the passage, the primary rhetorical function of Conee's bicycle example is to establish that an individual can possess the complete physiological and cognitive scaffolding required for a physical task without ever having engaged in the phenomenal experience of that task.
Answer: Answer