The Quine-Putnam indispensability argument asserts that one ought to have ontological commitment to all and only the entities that are indispensable to our best scientific theories; since mathematical entities are indispensable to these theories, they must exist. The nominalist Hartry Field counters this not by rejecting the normative premise regarding ontological commitment, but by attempting to demonstrate that mathematics is merely a useful fiction. Field's strategy involves reformulating scientific theories without reference to mathematical entities, arguing that such "nominalized" models remain empirically equivalent to standard versions. However, certain anti-nominalists argue that even a comprehensively successful nominalization of all scientific models would not neutralize the indispensability argument. These critics maintain that the nominalized models inevitably sacrifice crucial explanatory depth, thereby demonstrating that mathematics is indispensable for providing the explanatory power characteristic of our best scientific theories.
Based on the passage, which one of the following can be most strongly inferred regarding the views of the "certain anti-nominalists"?
- AA scientific theory cannot be considered empirically equivalent to a standard mathematical model if it sacrifices crucial explanatory depth.
- BThe primary purpose of scientific theories is to provide explanatory depth rather than to yield accurate empirical predictions.
- CField attempts to neutralize the indispensability argument by rejecting its initial premise regarding ontological commitment.
- It is possible for a theoretical model to be empirically equivalent to our best scientific theories without itself qualifying as one of those best theories.Answer
- EMathematical entities possess an objective reality that exists independently of the scientific theories that employ them.