Question

Passage A
The debate over punitive damages in tort law often centers on their theoretical justification and proper application within the broader legal system. Traditionally, punitive damages are viewed strictly through a lens of retribution and deterrence. Unlike compensatory damages, which are meticulously designed to make the injured party whole by quantifying their exact losses, punitive awards are intended to punish a defendant for particularly egregious, malicious conduct and to send a stark, public warning to deter others from engaging in similar behavior. Because they are fundamentally punitive in nature and carry a stigma of moral condemnation, appellate courts have historically been cautious. They insist that such damages be awarded only when the defendant's actions exhibit clear intentionality or extreme recklessness. Many legal scholars argue that expanding the scope of punitive damages dilutes their unique moral force and creates unpredictable liabilities. While it is widely recognized by legal professionals that standard compensatory awards rarely cover the complete financial and psychological burden placed on a plaintiff—especially given the inherently high costs of protracted litigation and the elusive, subjective nature of emotional distress—using punitive damages as a backdoor method to supplement inadequate compensation conflates two entirely distinct jurisprudential concepts. Punitive damages must remain exclusively a tool for societal condemnation, kept entirely separate from the restorative mechanics of restitution.

Passage B
In contemporary tort litigation, the rigid, formalistic bifurcation between compensatory and punitive damages is increasingly untenable and willfully ignores the operational realities of legal practice. The traditional jurisprudential view clings to the notion that compensatory damages fully rectify the plaintiff's injuries, leaving punitive damages solely for the realm of punishment. However, empirical observation reveals that the legal system routinely fails to fully indemnify plaintiffs through these standard restorative means. The structural realities of modern civil litigation, most notably exorbitant contingency fees that consume a large portion of any award, and the inherent difficulty of monetizing severe psychological harm or permanently diminished quality of life, dictate that plaintiffs are frequently left significantly less than whole even after receiving maximum standard compensatory awards. Consequently, judges and juries often implicitly utilize punitive damages to bridge this inevitable gap, attempting to ensure that the plaintiff is actually restored to something approximating their pre-injury status. Recognizing this operational reality requires us to broaden the formal criteria for awarding punitive damages rather than hiding behind outdated theories. Rather than restricting them strictly to cases of documented malicious intent, they should be made explicitly available in instances of gross negligence where the resulting uncompensated harm is profound. Acknowledging the de facto compensatory function of punitive awards does not necessarily eliminate their deterrent effect; rather, it provides a much more intellectually honest framework for understanding how justice is actually administered in the modern courtroom.

Which one of the following expresses a view shared by the authors of both passages?