The following dual passages discuss the doctrine of *stare decisis* in constitutional interpretation.
Passage A
The inherent tension between originalism—the interpretive theory positing that the Constitution must be construed according to its original public meaning—and the judicial doctrine of *stare decisis* remains a central preoccupation of modern jurisprudence. In its purest theoretical formulation, strict originalism leaves virtually no conceptual space for precedent. If a prior judicial decision contradicts the document's original meaning, that precedent represents an ongoing usurpation of the democratic process and must be overturned to restore true constitutional supremacy. However, most contemporary originalist scholars acknowledge a sobering reality: ruthlessly purging the entirety of non-originalist jurisprudence would precipitate intolerable systemic instability, invalidating decades of administrative law and commercial regulation. Consequently, a pragmatic accommodation is typically embraced. *Stare decisis* is permitted to shield demonstrably erroneous precedents in instances where societal, institutional, and economic reliance on those decisions is overwhelmingly entrenched. Yet, originalists are careful to emphasize that this accommodation is fundamentally a practical concession—a necessary exception to constitutional fidelity rather than a constituent element of constitutional meaning itself. For the rigorous originalist, a past decision never actually generates legitimate constitutional meaning; the doctrine of precedent merely dictates when the practical cost of correcting a historical interpretive error is deemed too steep for the broader legal system to bear.
Passage B
For jurists who conceptualize the Constitution as a dynamic, living framework, the doctrine of *stare decisis* serves as the vital engine of common-law incrementalism. It ensures that the law evolves systematically and organically, rather than through abrupt, destabilizing jurisprudential convulsions based on the shifting ideological composition of the bench. By affording profound respect to past decisions, courts foster essential legal predictability, safeguard reliance interests, and preserve the institutional legitimacy of the judiciary as a stable arbiter of disputes. Nevertheless, it is crucial to recognize that *stare decisis* is ultimately a principle of judicial policy and prudential administration, not an inexorable constitutional command. The veneration of precedent must never be permitted to ossify the law or thwart necessary social progress. When a past judicial decision is rendered obsolete by tectonic shifts in societal norms, or when its underlying doctrinal framework proves practically unworkable in contemporary contexts, that precedent must be decisively discarded. To treat judicial precedent as utterly sacrosanct is to chain present generations to the anachronistic factual assumptions and moral limitations of their predecessors. Thus, while precedent provides the indispensable scaffolding for legal development and stability, it must periodically yield to the overarching imperative of adapting constitutional interpretation to the complex exigencies of modern governance.
Both authors would be most likely to agree with which one of the following statements regarding the doctrine of *stare decisis*?
- AIt is a vital mechanism that ensures constitutional interpretation remains responsive to tectonic shifts in contemporary societal norms.
- Its continued employment is justified by practical imperatives involving legal stability rather than by its standing as an intrinsic source of constitutional meaning.Answer
- CIt functions as an inexorable judicial mandate that preserves the institutional legitimacy of courts by insulating established commercial regulations.
- DIt should be invariably suspended whenever a past judicial decision can be shown to contradict the original public meaning of the constitutional text.
- EIts primary value lies in its capacity to shield the judiciary from accusations of ideological bias when resolving disputes between competing legal theories.