Read the following passage:
In the latter half of the twentieth century, the conceptual foundation of customary international law (CIL) underwent a profound shift. Traditional legal positivists, operating under the assumption that state sovereignty is absolute, maintained that CIL is formed exclusively through the consistent practice of states acting out of a sense of legal obligation (*opinio juris*). From this orthodox perspective, treaties and explicit agreements are the only other legitimate sources of international obligation.
However, the proliferation of international human rights declarations challenged this state-centric model. Modern normative scholars, most notably Elara Vance, argue that the traditionalist reliance on state practice is inherently regressive, as it structurally privileges the actions of historically dominant states while ignoring the normative aspirations articulated in UN General Assembly resolutions. Vance asserts that in the realm of human rights, *opinio juris* can be inferred directly from these multilateral declarations, effectively bypassing the need for consistent historical state practice to establish binding international norms.
While Vance’s framework successfully explains the rapid integration of human rights norms into CIL, it risks diluting the very binding force it seeks to expand. By divorcing CIL from actual state behavior, normative scholars inadvertently supply authoritarian regimes with a rhetorical tool: such states can formally endorse aspirational resolutions at the UN, generating *opinio juris* under Vance's model, while simultaneously violating those very norms domestically with impunity. A more robust understanding of CIL must recognize that while General Assembly resolutions can catalyze the formation of customary law, they cannot substitute for the hard evidence of state compliance without reducing international law to mere diplomatic signaling.
Based on the passage, which one of the following statements about United Nations General Assembly resolutions is most accurately attributed to Elara Vance?
- AThey possess the capacity to accelerate the development of customary law but fundamentally depend on tangible state compliance to achieve binding force.
- BThey reflect an inherently regressive approach to international law because they structurally prioritize the interests of historically dominant states.
- They are sufficient, independent of historical state behavior, for deriving the sense of legal obligation necessary to establish binding international human rights norms.Answer
- DThey inadvertently provide authoritarian regimes with a mechanism to generate international legal obligations without requiring genuine domestic compliance.
- EThey constitute the only legitimate source of international obligation outside of formal treaties and explicit agreements in the modern era.