Question

In the late nineteenth century, American jurisprudence was dominated by legal formalism, a paradigm that viewed the law as a complete and autonomous system of logically consistent principles. Formalist judges maintained that legal outcomes could be deduced mechanically from established precedents, isolating the law from social, political, and economic contexts. However, the early twentieth century witnessed the rise of legal realism, a movement spearheaded by scholars like Karl Llewellyn and Jerome Frank. The realists fundamentally challenged the formalist premise, arguing that judicial decision-making is inherently subjective and deeply influenced by the judge's personal biases, policy preferences, and the specific socioeconomic realities of the time.

For the realists, the formalist ideal of an entirely predictable and objective legal system was an illusion. They pointed out that precedent is often ambiguous or contradictory, allowing judges to select whichever past cases best support their desired outcomes. Consequently, realists argued that to understand how the law truly operates, one must look beyond the written statutes and appellate opinions to the actual behavior of judges and the practical consequences of their rulings. While critics of legal realism feared that this perspective would lead to judicial lawlessness and erode public confidence in the courts, the realists maintained that acknowledging the subjective elements of adjudication was a necessary first step toward creating a more transparent, equitable, and socially responsive legal system.

Based on the passage, legal realists would be most likely to agree with which of the following statements regarding legal precedent?