A logistics company is implementing a centralized identity strategy for its AWS multi-account environment. The company hosts its user directory in a third-party SAML Identity Provider (IdP). To streamline administrative overhead, they want to establish direct console federation to target AWS member accounts. An administrator configures the SAML metadata in the member accounts and defines an IAM role named `LogisticsOperatorRole` for the users. However, when operators attempt to log in through the IdP portal, they are blocked with an authentication error. An analysis of the trust relationships reveals that the authentication handshake is failing at the Security Token Service (STS) endpoint. Which configuration must the administrator apply to the `LogisticsOperatorRole` trust policy to resolve this issue?
- ASet the trust policy's `Principal` to the ARN of the SAML provider created in the member account, set the `Action` to `sts:AssumeRole`, and add a `Condition` block that evaluates the `SAML:iss` context key to match the IdP entity ID.
- Set the trust policy's `Principal` to the ARN of the SAML provider created in the member account, set the `Action` to `sts:AssumeRoleWithSAML`, and add a `Condition` block that evaluates `SAML:aud` to match `https://signin.aws.amazon.com/saml`.Cevap
- CAttach a Service Control Policy (SCP) to the member accounts' Organizational Unit that authorizes `sts:AssumeRoleWithSAML` for the external IdP's domain, which dynamically creates the temporary credentials without requiring an IAM role trust policy.
- DSet the trust policy's `Principal` to reference the IdP's metadata endpoint URL directly, set the `Action` to `sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity`, and configure the policy to use the default AWS-managed KMS key (`aws/kms`) for decrypting the assertion token.