A high-growth fintech startup organizes its workloads across several AWS accounts managed under AWS Organizations. The security team has defined a strict governance posture: Sandbox accounts, grouped under a dedicated 'Sandbox' Organizational Unit (OU), must be limited to using only Amazon EC2, Amazon S3, and AWS Lambda. Local administrators in the Sandbox accounts must not be allowed to modify, delete, or bypass a centralized security monitoring IAM role named 'CentralSecurityAuditRole' deployed in each account. Additionally, developers in the Sandbox accounts must retain the ability to create and manage their own local IAM roles and policies for application testing, without the capability of elevating their permissions to modify the security monitoring role. Which design strategy should a solutions architect implement to meet these requirements with the least administrative overhead?
- AAttach a Service Control Policy (SCP) to the Sandbox OU that explicitly grants permissions for EC2, S3, and Lambda, while relying on the SCP to automatically deny local administrators the ability to delete any IAM role that starts with 'CentralSecurityAuditRole'.
- BDefine the permission limitations in a customer managed policy, share this policy with the Sandbox accounts using AWS Resource Access Manager (RAM), and instruct the local administrators to apply this shared policy as a permissions boundary on all developer-created IAM roles.
- Attach a Service Control Policy (SCP) to the Sandbox OU that denies all actions not belonging to the EC2, S3, and Lambda service namespaces, and denies all IAM modification and deletion actions where the resource matches the ARN of the 'CentralSecurityAuditRole'. Allow the default FullAWSAccess SCP to remain, and instruct developers to use local IAM policies for granting their day-to-day permissions.Cevap
- DConfigure a Service Control Policy (SCP) that restricts service access to EC2, S3, and Lambda. To protect the auditing role, deploy a local IAM policy in each account that denies access to the role, and configure the SAML federation trust relationship to block developers from assuming any roles that possess IAM write capabilities.