Layer 2 Security Features (Port Security, DHCP Snooping, DAI)

48 soru

Soru 21Soru

A network engineer enables Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) on VLAN 20 of a Cisco Catalyst switch where DHCP Snooping is also active. All access interfaces on VLAN 20 are left in the default untrusted state. A critical host connected to interface GigabitEthernet1/0/12 is configured with a static IP address (192.168.20.50/24192.168.20.50/24) and MAC address (0050.56a1.23bc0050.56a1.23bc). Consequently, DAI drops all ARP requests sent by this host because no entry exists for it in the DHCP snooping binding database. The engineer must allow this host to communicate while keeping GigabitEthernet1/0/12 untrusted and maintaining DAI protection on VLAN 20. Which command sequence must be configured on the switch to resolve this issue?

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Cevap: Define an ARP ACL using 'arp access-list STATIC_HOST', permit IP 192.168.20.50 and MAC 0050.56a1.23bc, and apply it with 'ip arp inspection filter STATIC_HOST vlan 20'.

Cevap

Configure an ARP access list matching the static IP and MAC addresses ('arp access-list STATIC_HOST' followed by 'permit ip host 192.168.20.50 mac host 0050.56a1.23bc') and bind it to DAI on the VLAN using 'ip arp inspection filter STATIC_HOST vlan 20'.
Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) validates ARP requests and responses on untrusted ports against the DHCP snooping binding database. Because hosts with static IP configurations do not request IP addresses via DHCP, their IP-to-MAC mappings do not exist in the snooping database. To support static hosts without configuring the port as trusted (which would disable DAI checks entirely on that interface), an ARP access list (ARP ACL) must be configured with the host IP and MAC address, then applied to the VLAN using the 'ip arp inspection filter' command.

Adım Adım Çözüm

1
Analyze the cause of packet drops under Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI).
DAI inspects ARP packets on untrusted ports against the DHCP snooping binding database. Statically addressed hosts do not generate DHCP requests, so they lack database entries and their ARP traffic is dropped.
Untrusted ports undergo mandatory IP-to-MAC binding verification by DAI.
2
Identify the Cisco IOS mechanism for bypassing DHCP snooping database checks for static hosts while preserving DAI.
Configuring an ARP ACL allows administrators to manually define static IP-to-MAC bindings.
DAI evaluates configured ARP ACLs first before falling back to the DHCP snooping binding database.
3
Apply the ARP ACL to the targeted VLAN.
The command 'ip arp inspection filter <acl-name> vlan <vlan-id>' explicitly permits the static host ARP traffic on untrusted ports.
This maintains port untrusted security status for all other hosts while granting an exception for the static host.

Anahtar Kavram

Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) ARP ACL Integration for Statically Configured Hosts
Tahmini Süre:2m 0s
Soru 22Soru

A network administrator is implementing Layer 2 security controls on Cisco Catalyst access switches. Match each Layer 2 security feature mechanism on the left to its corresponding operational behavior on the right.

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Öğeler

DHCP Snooping Option 82 Insertion
Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI)
Port Security Sticky MAC Learning
Port Security Restrict Violation Mode

Eşleşmeler

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Cevap

DHCP Snooping Option 82 Insertion attaches relay agent information to DHCP requests on untrusted ports. Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) intercepts and checks ARP requests against the DHCP binding database on untrusted interfaces. Port Security Sticky MAC Learning dynamically converts learned MAC addresses into running configuration entries. Port Security Restrict Violation Mode drops unauthorized frames, increments the violation counter, and sends a Syslog message without shutting down the interface.
Each feature is paired with its precise Layer 2 operational behavior. DHCP Snooping Option 82 inserts circuit details into client requests. DAI mitigates ARP poisoning by cross-referencing ARP headers against the DHCP snooping database. Sticky MAC converts dynamic address learning into explicit running-configuration statements. Restrict mode drops offending frames and logs an alert while preserving link availability.

Adım Adım Çözüm

1
Analyze DHCP Snooping Option 82 mechanism
Identified that Option 82 adds relay agent metadata (such as switch chassis ID and port interface ID) to client requests on untrusted ports.
Option 82 provides location information to help DHCP servers assign IP addresses and policy parameters.
2
Analyze Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) verification mechanism
Determined that DAI validates incoming ARP packets against IP-to-MAC mappings stored in the DHCP snooping binding table.
DAI prevents ARP spoofing and poisoning by dropping invalid ARP packets on untrusted ports.
3
Examine Port Security sticky MAC functionality
Confirmed that sticky MAC dynamically discovers connected devices and writes them to running-config as static MAC entries.
Sticky MAC saves administrators from manually entering host MAC addresses while enforcing access restrictions.
4
Differentiate Port Security violation modes (protect vs restrict vs shutdown)
Matched restrict mode to dropping frames, logging Syslog messages, and incrementing violation counters without err-disabling the interface.
Protect mode drops frames silently without logging, whereas shutdown mode disables the interface entirely.

Anahtar Kavram

Layer 2 Security Mechanisms and Operational Characteristics
Soru 23Soru

Match each Cisco Layer 2 security feature or operational state on the left to its corresponding operational behavior on the right.

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Öğeler

Port Security (Restrict Mode)
DHCP Snooping Untrusted Interface
Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI)
Port Security (Sticky MAC)

Eşleşmeler

Cevabı ve açıklamayı göster

Cevap

Port Security (Restrict Mode) matches with dropping unauthorized frames, incrementing the violation counter, and logging without shutting the interface down. DHCP Snooping Untrusted Interface matches with blocking incoming DHCP server responses and building the binding table from client traffic. Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) matches with intercepting and validating ARP packets against the binding database. Port Security (Sticky MAC) matches with dynamically adding learned MAC addresses as secure entries in the running configuration.
Each feature maps to its exact Cisco IOS operational behavior: Restrict mode logs and drops without disabling the port; DHCP Snooping untrusted ports drop server responses; DAI validates ARP frames against the DHCP binding table; and Sticky MAC converts dynamically learned addresses into running-config entries.

Adım Adım Çözüm

1
Analyze Port Security violation modes
Identify that 'restrict' drops traffic, logs a message, and increments counters without disabling the port (unlike 'shutdown' mode which err-disables the interface).
Differentiating between protect, restrict, and shutdown modes is essential for Layer 2 access control.
2
Analyze DHCP Snooping interface roles
Recognize that untrusted ports drop DHCP server response packets (DHCPOFFER, DHCPACK) to prevent rogue DHCP server attacks.
DHCP Snooping enforces trust boundaries between user access ports (untrusted) and legitimate DHCP server ports (trusted).
3
Analyze Dynamic ARP Inspection mechanics
Confirm DAI checks incoming ARP packets on untrusted interfaces against the DHCP Snooping IP-to-MAC binding database.
DAI depends on the integrity of the DHCP Snooping binding table to mitigate man-in-the-middle ARP spoofing.
4
Analyze Sticky MAC address persistence
Verify that sticky MAC learning places dynamically discovered MAC addresses directly into the active running configuration.
Sticky MAC addresses persist in memory until saved to startup-config via copy running-config startup-config.

Anahtar Kavram

Layer 2 security mitigations (Port Security violation modes, DHCP Snooping trust roles, and Dynamic ARP Inspection validation mechanics).
Soru 24Soru

A network engineer is implementing Layer 2 security controls across access switches in an enterprise network. The design requires deploying Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) alongside DHCP Snooping to mitigate ARP spoofing attacks. Which TWO statements correctly describe the operational interactions and interface trust requirements for these features?

Geçerli olan tümünü seçin

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Cevap: DAI inspects incoming ARP requests and responses on untrusted interfaces by validating the IP-to-MAC mapping against the DHCP snooping binding database.; Access ports connected to end-user host workstations should be configured as untrusted for both DHCP Snooping and Dynamic ARP Inspection.

Cevap

The correct statements are that DAI inspects incoming ARP packets on untrusted interfaces against the DHCP snooping binding database, and that user-facing access ports must be set as untrusted for both security features.
Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) relies directly on the binding table populated by DHCP Snooping to validate ARP packets received on untrusted ports. In standard Layer 2 security deployments, host-facing access ports are designated as untrusted for both DHCP Snooping (blocking rogue DHCP server offers) and DAI (blocking spoofed ARP announcements).

Adım Adım Çözüm

1
Analyze how Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) operates on untrusted interfaces.
DAI intercepts all ARP requests and responses on untrusted ports and verifies their IP-to-MAC bindings using the DHCP snooping binding database or static ARP ACLs.
This mechanism prevents man-in-the-middle ARP poisoning attacks on the local switch segment.
2
Evaluate port trust configurations for host-facing interfaces.
Access ports connecting client endpoints must remain untrusted for both DHCP Snooping and DAI.
Untrusted ports are subjected to rate limiting and packet validation checks to block unauthorized DHCP responses and spoofed ARP replies.
3
Evaluate misconceptions regarding database persistence and trunk VLAN mismatches.
Dynamic bindings are stored in RAM and not automatically written to startup-config. Furthermore, native VLAN mismatches affect trunking semantics but do not disable DAI filtering.
Understanding feature isolation prevents incorrect troubleshooting assumptions regarding switch state saving and multi-vlan trunking errors.

Anahtar Kavram

Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) and DHCP Snooping Integration and Port Trust States
Soru 25Soru

A network administrator enables DHCP Snooping globally and on VLAN 20. To protect against DHCP denial-of-service (DoS) starvation attacks, the administrator configures `ip dhcp snooping limit rate 15` on all untrusted access interfaces. Shortly after, a user workstation interface transitions into the `err-disabled` state. Which operational behavior explains why this interface was placed into the `err-disabled` state?

Cevabı ve açıklamayı göster

Cevap: The interface received DHCP traffic exceeding the threshold of 15 packets per second configured on the untrusted port.

Cevap

The interface received DHCP traffic exceeding the threshold of 15 packets per second configured on the untrusted port.
Configuring `ip dhcp snooping limit rate` on an untrusted interface imposes a ceiling on incoming DHCP control traffic. If a connected device sends DHCP messages faster than the configured threshold (15 packets per second in this scenario), the switch detects a rate violation and immediately transitions the port to the `err-disabled` state to protect network resources.

Adım Adım Çözüm

1
Identify the Layer 2 security feature and command configured on the interface.
The switch has DHCP Snooping rate limiting configured via `ip dhcp snooping limit rate 15` on untrusted access interfaces.
This command sets a maximum allowed rate of 15 DHCP packets per second on untrusted ports.
2
Analyze the switch response when the rate limit threshold is exceeded.
If an untrusted host sends more than 15 DHCP packets per second, the switch shuts down the port and places it in the err-disabled state.
DHCP Snooping rate limiting enforces traffic ceilings to mitigate DHCP exhaustion/starvation attacks.

Anahtar Kavram

DHCP Snooping Interface Rate Limiting
Soru 26Soru

Match each Cisco Layer 2 security feature or operational state on the left to its corresponding system action or behavior on the right.

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Öğeler

Port Security Protect Mode
Port Security Restrict Mode
Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI)
DHCP Snooping Untrusted Port

Eşleşmeler

Cevabı ve açıklamayı göster

Cevap

Port Security Protect Mode matches dropping traffic silently without counter increments or log messages. Port Security Restrict Mode matches dropping traffic while incrementing the violation counter and logging. Dynamic ARP Inspection matches validating ARP packets against the DHCP binding database. DHCP Snooping Untrusted Port matches discarding incoming DHCP server packets like DHCPOFFER and DHCPACK.
Each feature is correctly matched to its specific control-plane or data-plane enforcement mechanism: Protect mode drops frames without logging; Restrict mode drops frames with logging and counter increments; Dynamic ARP Inspection verifies ARP packets using the DHCP snooping binding database; untrusted DHCP snooping ports drop inbound server messages (DHCPOFFER/DHCPACK).

Adım Adım Çözüm

1
Analyze Port Security violation modes (Protect vs. Restrict)
Protect mode drops unauthorized MAC traffic silently (no counter increment, no syslog). Restrict mode drops unauthorized traffic, increments the security violation counter, and generates syslog/SNMP alerts.
Differentiating violation modes requires knowing which modes generate alerts and counters versus silent frame drops.
2
Analyze Dynamic ARP Inspection operational requirements
DAI inspects ARP packets on untrusted ports and verifies the MAC-to-IP binding against the switch's DHCP snooping binding table.
DAI relies directly on the DHCP snooping database (or static ARP ACLs) to mitigate ARP poisoning and spoofing attacks.
3
Analyze DHCP Snooping port trust roles
Untrusted ports permit client requests (DHCPDISCOVER/DHCPREQUEST) but drop incoming server responses (DHCPOFFER/DHCPACK).
Preventing rogue DHCP servers requires blocking DHCP server response messages on user-facing untrusted ports.

Anahtar Kavram

Layer 2 Security Mechanisms (Port Security Violation Modes, DAI Operation, DHCP Snooping Trust States)
Soru 27Soru

A network administrator configures port security on access interface GigabitEthernet0/10 of a Cisco Catalyst switch using the command `switchport port-security mac-address sticky`. Over the next week, several workstations connect to the port, and their MAC addresses are dynamically added to the running configuration. Following an unscheduled power outage and switch reboot, the administrator discovers that the connected workstations are unable to gain access and port security sticky entries are missing from the configuration. What was the root cause of this issue?

Cevabı ve açıklamayı göster

Cevap: The administrator did not save the running configuration to the startup configuration after the sticky MAC addresses were learned.

Cevap

The administrator did not save the running configuration to the startup configuration after the sticky MAC addresses were learned.
When port security is configured with the sticky keyword, dynamically learned MAC addresses are converted into static-like entries and placed directly into the running configuration in RAM. Because RAM is volatile memory, any dynamic sticky entries learned while the switch is operational will be completely lost upon a switch reboot unless the administrator manually executes `copy running-config startup-config` (or `write memory`) to copy the running configuration into non-volatile storage (NVRAM).

Adım Adım Çözüm

1
Analyze how sticky MAC addressing operates in Cisco Port Security.
When `switchport port-security mac-address sticky` is configured, the switch dynamically learns MAC addresses and adds them to the active running configuration file (`running-config`) as static entries.
Understanding where learned sticky addresses are saved during active operation.
2
Evaluate memory persistence across switch reboots.
The `running-config` resides in volatile RAM. If the switch reboots before `copy running-config startup-config` or `write memory` is executed, any dynamically added sticky MAC lines in RAM are lost.
Determining why sticky MAC entries disappeared after the reboot.
3
Identify the required administrative action to preserve sticky MACs.
Saving the running configuration commits the dynamically learned sticky MAC lines to NVRAM (`startup-config`), ensuring persistence across power cycles.
Pinpointing the missing step causing the loss of network access.

Anahtar Kavram

Port Security Sticky MAC Address Persistence
Tahmini Süre:1m 15s
Soru 28Soru

A network administrator is implementing Layer 2 security controls on an access switch, configuring Port Security with sticky MAC address learning alongside DHCP Snooping on edge switch ports. Which two statements correctly describe the operational behavior of these features? (Select two.)

Geçerli olan tümünü seçin

Cevabı ve açıklamayı göster

Cevap: Dynamically learned sticky MAC addresses are added directly to the running configuration in RAM.; DHCP server response messages, such as DHCPOFFER and DHCPACK, are dropped when received on an untrusted port.

Cevap

The correct answers state that dynamically learned sticky MAC addresses are appended to the running configuration in RAM, and that DHCP server messages (such as DHCPOFFER and DHCPACK) arriving on untrusted ports are dropped by DHCP Snooping.
When port security sticky learning is configured, learned MAC addresses are converted into static-like MAC entries directly in the running-config in active RAM. Additionally, DHCP Snooping enforces boundary security by designating access interfaces as untrusted by default, dropping any DHCP server messages (such as DHCPACK or DHCPOFFER) that attempt to enter an untrusted interface.

Adım Adım Çözüm

1
Analyze Port Security sticky MAC behavior
Confirm that sticky MAC learning dynamically populates the running configuration in RAM, which requires a manual save to startup configuration to persist across reboots.
Sticky MAC addresses act as static entries in running-config, but RAM is volatile memory.
2
Analyze DHCP Snooping port trust rules
Confirm that untrusted ports are only permitted to send DHCP requests from clients, while server responses (DHCPACK, DHCPOFFER) are intercepted and dropped.
Untrusted ports represent client-facing links, preventing rogue DHCP servers from handing out invalid addresses.

Anahtar Kavram

Port Security Sticky MAC Persistence and DHCP Snooping Trust Verification
Soru 29Soru

A network administrator is implementing Layer 2 security on VLAN 30 of a Cisco Catalyst switch. The VLAN contains both dynamic DHCP clients and devices with statically configured IP addresses. DHCP Snooping is active on VLAN 30.

To allow traffic from the static IP devices that do not exist in the DHCP snooping binding database, the administrator creates an ARP Access Control List (ACL) named `STATIC_DEVICES` matching the static MAC and IP pairs, and executes the following command:

`Switch(config)# ip arp inspection filter STATIC_DEVICES vlan 30`

Immediately after applying this command, static IP hosts communicate successfully, but all dynamic DHCP clients on VLAN 30 lose connectivity because their ARP packets are dropped by Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI).

Which configuration modification must be made to permit ARP traffic from both static IP devices and dynamic DHCP clients?

Cevabı ve açıklamayı göster

Cevap: Re-enter the command with the `static` keyword: `ip arp inspection filter STATIC_DEVICES vlan 30 static`.

Cevap

Re-entering the command with the `static` keyword (`ip arp inspection filter STATIC_DEVICES vlan 30 static`) allows unlisted ARP packets to fall back to verification against the DHCP snooping binding database.
When an ARP ACL is bound to a VLAN for Dynamic ARP Inspection without the `static` keyword, the ARP ACL becomes the sole authority for ARP validation on that VLAN. Packets that do not match an explicit entry in the ARP ACL hit the implicit `deny any` and are dropped without consulting the DHCP snooping binding database. Appending the `static` keyword (`ip arp inspection filter STATIC_DEVICES vlan 30 static`) instructs DAI to check the ARP ACL first for static hosts, and if no match is found, fall back to checking the DHCP snooping binding database for dynamic clients.

Adım Adım Çözüm

1
Analyze how DAI evaluates ARP ACL filters without the `static` keyword.
When `ip arp inspection filter <acl-name> vlan <vlan>` is applied without `static`, DAI checks the specified ARP ACL exclusively. If an ARP packet does not match an explicit `permit` entry, it hits the implicit `deny` at the end of the ACL and is dropped without checking the DHCP snooping binding database.
Omitting `static` makes the ARP ACL authoritative for all ARP traffic on that VLAN.
2
Determine the effect of adding the `static` keyword to the DAI filter command.
Including the `static` keyword (`ip arp inspection filter <acl-name> vlan <vlan> static`) changes the evaluation flow: DAI checks the ARP ACL first. If no match is found in the ACL, DAI falls back to evaluating the packet against the DHCP snooping binding database.
This allows static IP devices (permitted by the ARP ACL) and dynamic DHCP clients (validated via the binding database) to coexist on the same VLAN.

Anahtar Kavram

DAI ARP ACL Filtering Mechanics and the `static` Keyword Fallback
Tahmini Süre:2m 0s
Soru 30Soru

A network administrator enables port security on a switch access port using the command switchport port-security mac-address sticky. Devices connect to the port, and their MAC addresses are dynamically added to the switch configuration. However, after a planned reload of the switch, the port loses all learned MAC addresses and fails to forward traffic for previously connected hosts. What is the primary cause of this issue?

Cevabı ve açıklamayı göster

Cevap: The administrator failed to save the running configuration to the startup configuration after the sticky MAC addresses were learned.

Cevap

The administrator failed to save the running configuration to the startup configuration after the sticky MAC addresses were learned.
When `switchport port-security mac-address sticky` is configured, dynamically learned MAC addresses are converted into static-like entries in the active `running-config`. Because `running-config` resides in volatile RAM, these learned MAC address lines are lost during a reboot unless saved to NVRAM (`startup-config`) using `copy running-config startup-config`.

Adım Adım Çözüm

1
Analyze how sticky MAC learning operates in Cisco IOS port security.
When sticky MAC learning is enabled, dynamically learned MAC addresses are immediately placed into the running configuration (`running-config`) as static entries.
This avoids having to manually type static MAC addresses while securing the port.
2
Evaluate the persistence of running configuration entries across switch reboots.
Entries in `running-config` reside in volatile memory and are lost upon a reboot unless explicitly copied to `startup-config`.
To maintain learned sticky MAC addresses permanently across device reloads, the network administrator must execute `copy running-config startup-config` or `write memory`.

Anahtar Kavram

Port Security Sticky MAC Address Persistence
Tahmini Süre:45s
Soru 31Soru

An administrator configures port security on a Cisco Catalyst switch access interface using the command switchport port-security mac-address sticky. End devices connect to the port, and their MAC addresses are dynamically converted to sticky MAC addresses. Following a scheduled reload of the switch, the connected devices lose network connectivity. What is the root cause of this issue?

Cevabı ve açıklamayı göster

Cevap: The running configuration was not saved to the startup configuration after the sticky MAC addresses were learned.

Cevap

The running configuration was not saved to the startup configuration after the sticky MAC addresses were learned.
When port security sticky learning is configured, dynamically learned MAC addresses are converted into sticky entries within the running configuration. Because the running configuration resides in volatile RAM, failing to save the running configuration to the startup configuration causes all learned sticky MAC entries to be lost when the switch reloads.

Adım Adım Çözüm

1
Identify how sticky MAC address learning behaves in Cisco IOS port security.
When sticky learning is enabled via `switchport port-security mac-address sticky`, dynamically learned MAC addresses are automatically added to the active running configuration as static port security entries.
Sticky learning allows dynamic learning of MAC addresses while populating the running configuration so manual entry of MAC addresses is not required.
2
Evaluate the persistence of running configuration changes across device reloads.
The running configuration resides in RAM. If `copy running-config startup-config` is not issued before a reboot, all dynamically added sticky MAC entries are erased.
The switch reloads using the startup configuration stored in NVRAM, which does not contain the un-saved sticky MAC statements.

Anahtar Kavram

Port Security Sticky MAC Persistence
Soru 32Soru

Match each Cisco Layer 2 security feature or interface trust state on the left with its correct operational behavior or dependency on the right.

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Öğeler

Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI)
DHCP Snooping Untrusted Interface
Port Security Sticky MAC Learning
DHCP Snooping Binding Database

Eşleşmeler

Cevabı ve açıklamayı göster

Cevap

Dynamic ARP Inspection matches with validating ARP packets against IP-to-MAC mappings. DHCP Snooping Untrusted Interface matches with dropping unauthorized DHCP server responses. Port Security Sticky MAC Learning matches with adding dynamically learned MAC addresses to the running configuration. DHCP Snooping Binding Database matches with tracking IP, MAC, VLAN, and interface bindings.
Dynamic ARP Inspection operates by validating incoming ARP packets against trusted IP-to-MAC bindings stored in the DHCP snooping binding database. An untrusted DHCP snooping interface blocks incoming server response messages (OFFER/ACK) to prevent rogue DHCP server deployment. Port Security sticky MAC learning writes dynamically learned host MAC addresses directly into the running configuration. The DHCP Snooping Binding Database stores client IP, MAC, VLAN, and port associations which are referenced by security features like DAI.

Adım Adım Çözüm

1
Analyze Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) functionality
DAI inspects ARP packets on untrusted ports and compares their source MAC and IP against trusted database entries.
DAI mitigates ARP spoofing by verifying ARP packet payload integrity.
2
Analyze DHCP Snooping interface trust states
Untrusted ports only permit DHCP client requests (DISCOVER, REQUEST); server responses (OFFER, ACK) are dropped.
Access ports default to untrusted to prevent unauthorized rogue DHCP servers.
3
Analyze Port Security sticky MAC learning behavior
Learned MAC addresses are written to the running configuration under the interface context.
Sticky MAC allows automatic MAC learning while preserving learned entries across link resets without manual static entry.
4
Identify the role of the DHCP Snooping Binding Database
It holds the IP-MAC-VLAN-Port binding entries populated by DHCP ACK messages.
Other L2 security mechanisms like DAI rely on this database to validate packets.

Anahtar Kavram

Layer 2 Security Mechanisms and Dependencies (Port Security, DHCP Snooping, DAI)
Soru 33Soru

An administrator attempts to secure VLAN 20 on a Cisco Catalyst switch by executing the commands `ip dhcp snooping vlan 20` and `ip arp inspection vlan 20`. Access interface GigabitEthernet0/2 is in VLAN 20 and remains in its default untrusted state for both security features. Clients connected to GigabitEthernet0/2 are configured with static IP addresses, but all outgoing ARP packets from these clients are intercepted and dropped by the switch, preventing any network communication. Which root cause explains why Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) is dropping this ARP traffic?

Cevabı ve açıklamayı göster

Cevap: Global DHCP snooping was not activated using the `ip dhcp snooping` command, causing the DHCP binding database to remain unpopulated and DAI to reject all ARP packets on untrusted ports.

Cevap

Global DHCP snooping was not activated using the `ip dhcp snooping` command, preventing the switch from building the DHCP binding database required by Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) to validate ARP packets on untrusted ports.
The correct option explains that Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) depends directly on the DHCP snooping binding database to inspect ARP packets received on untrusted ports. Enabling DHCP snooping on a VLAN (`ip dhcp snooping vlan 20`) without executing the global `ip dhcp snooping` command leaves DHCP snooping globally disabled. As a result, the switch does not build a binding database. When DAI is enabled on VLAN 20 (`ip arp inspection vlan 20`), it intercepts all ARP packets on untrusted ports; because the binding table is empty and no ARP ACL is defined for static hosts, DAI drops all incoming ARP packets.

Adım Adım Çözüm

1
Analyze how Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) validates ARP packets.
DAI inspects incoming ARP requests and responses on untrusted ports and verifies the sender IP and MAC addresses against the DHCP Snooping Binding Database (or configured ARP ACLs).
Untrusted ports drop ARP packets if no corresponding IP-to-MAC entry exists in the binding table.
2
Evaluate the switch configuration sequence provided in the scenario.
The administrator configured `ip dhcp snooping vlan 20`, but omitted the global `ip dhcp snooping` command.
In Cisco IOS, VLAN-level DHCP snooping does not take effect unless DHCP snooping is enabled globally.
3
Determine the impact on static IP hosts on untrusted ports.
Because global DHCP snooping is disabled, no DHCP binding database is built. Additionally, statically assigned hosts generate no DHCP transactions to populate the database.
Without static ARP ACL mappings or an active DHCP binding database entry, DAI drops all ARP traffic on untrusted interfaces like GigabitEthernet0/2.

Anahtar Kavram

Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) reliance on the DHCP Snooping Binding Database and global feature enablement prerequisites.
Soru 34Soru

An administrator enables port security on a Cisco switch interface using default settings without specifying a violation mode. What default action will the switch take if an unauthorized device connects to this interface?

Cevabı ve açıklamayı göster

Cevap: It immediately shuts down the interface, places it into an err-disabled state, and turns off the port LED.

Cevap

The switch immediately shuts down the interface, places it into an err-disabled state, and turns off the port LED.
When port security is enabled on a Cisco switch interface, the default violation mode is shutdown. When an unauthorized MAC address triggers a violation, the interface is immediately placed in an err-disabled state, disabling all traffic through the port until manually re-enabled or automatically recovered.

Adım Adım Çözüm

1
Identify the default violation mode for Cisco port security.
The default violation mode is shutdown.
When port-security is enabled without specifying a violation action using `switchport port-security violation`, the switch defaults to `shutdown`.
2
Determine the switch reaction when a violation occurs under shutdown mode.
The port transitions to the err-disabled state and stops forwarding all traffic.
Shutdown mode disables the interface entirely, turns off the link LED, increments the violation counter, and generates a syslog message.

Anahtar Kavram

Port Security Default Violation Mode
Soru 35Soru

Match each port security violation mode on the left with its corresponding switch behavior when an unauthorized MAC address is detected on an interface.

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Öğeler

Protect Mode
Restrict Mode
Shutdown Mode

Eşleşmeler

Cevabı ve açıklamayı göster

Cevap

Protect mode matches silent packet dropping without counters; Restrict mode matches packet dropping with violation counter increments and Syslog notifications; Shutdown mode matches error-disabling the port and generating notifications.
Each violation mode dictates how Cisco IOS handles unauthorized frames on a secured port. Protect silently drops unauthorized traffic; Restrict drops unauthorized traffic while logging and counting violations; Shutdown disables the entire port by placing it into the err-disabled state.

Adım Adım Çözüm

1
Identify the behavior of Protect mode.
Protect mode drops frames from unauthorized MAC addresses without logging or updating counters.
Protect is designed for silent dropping of unauthorized frames.
2
Identify the behavior of Restrict mode.
Restrict mode drops frames from unauthorized MAC addresses while actively logging Syslog alerts and incrementing violation counters.
Restrict mode alerts administrators while leaving the interface active for authorized traffic.
3
Identify the behavior of Shutdown mode.
Shutdown mode disables the port entirely, transitioning it to the err-disabled state upon a violation.
Shutdown is the most restrictive default mode in Cisco IOS port security.

Anahtar Kavram

Port Security Violation Modes (Protect, Restrict, Shutdown)
Soru 36Soru

A network administrator enables Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) on VLAN 20 of a Cisco Catalyst switch. DHCP Snooping is enabled on VLAN 20, but several legacy printers on untrusted access ports use static IPv4 addresses and are not recorded in the DHCP snooping binding database. Consequently, DAI drops legitimate ARP packets originating from these printers. Which two configuration actions must the administrator perform to allow ARP traffic from the static hosts while maintaining DAI inspection on those untrusted ports? (Select two.)

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Cevabı ve açıklamayı göster

Cevap: Define an ARP Access Control List (ARP ACL) using `arp access-list` that maps the static host IP addresses to their corresponding MAC addresses.; Apply the ARP ACL to VLAN 20 using the global configuration command `ip arp inspection filter <acl-name> vlan 20`.

Cevap

To support static hosts with Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) without disabling security on untrusted ports, the administrator must create an ARP ACL containing static IP-to-MAC mappings and apply that ARP ACL to the VLAN using the `ip arp inspection filter` command.
Dynamic ARP Inspection relies on the DHCP snooping binding database to validate ARP packets on untrusted ports. When hosts are configured with static IP addresses, their bindings are absent from the DHCP snooping table. The standard Cisco IOS solution is to create an ARP ACL containing static IP-to-MAC permits and apply it to the VLAN using `ip arp inspection filter <acl-name> vlan <vlan-id>`.

Adım Adım Çözüm

1
Identify the cause of packet drops under Dynamic ARP Inspection
DAI inspects incoming ARP requests and responses on untrusted ports against the DHCP snooping binding database. Statically addressed hosts lack entries in this database, causing DAI to mark their ARP packets as invalid.
DAI default behavior drops all ARP traffic on untrusted interfaces if the IP-to-MAC mapping is not verified.
2
Create an ARP Access Control List (ARP ACL)
Define an ARP ACL using `arp access-list <acl-name>` and permit ARP traffic matching the static IP address and MAC address of each static host.
ARP ACLs provide a mechanism to manually define valid static bindings for endpoints that bypass DHCP.
3
Filter DAI traffic on the target VLAN using the ARP ACL
Apply the ACL using `ip arp inspection filter <acl-name> vlan 20`.
This command instructs DAI to check the ARP ACL first when validating ARP frames on untrusted interfaces within VLAN 20.

Anahtar Kavram

Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) static host support via ARP ACLs
Soru 37Soru

A network engineer is hardening an enterprise access layer switch using Cisco Layer 2 security features. Match each specific Layer 2 security feature configuration component on the left with its exact operational behavior or validation requirement on the right.

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Öğeler

Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) on an untrusted access port
DHCP Snooping Option 82 handling on an untrusted port
Port Security sticky MAC address learning (`switchport port-security mac-address sticky`)
DHCP Snooping Rate Limiting (`ip dhcp snooping limit rate`)

Eşleşmeler

Cevabı ve açıklamayı göster

Cevap

Dynamic ARP Inspection matches validating ARP sender MAC/IP pairings against the DHCP snooping binding table. DHCP Snooping Option 82 handling on untrusted ports matches dropping incoming DHCP packets containing non-zero GIADDR or Option 82 payloads by default. Port Security sticky MAC learning matches adding dynamically learned MACs to running-config requiring an explicit copy to startup-config for boot persistence. DHCP Snooping rate limiting matches tracking incoming DHCP packet frequency and err-disabling interfaces that exceed configured thresholds.
Each feature is correctly matched to its functional behavior: Dynamic ARP Inspection validates ingress ARP packets against the DHCP snooping database; DHCP Snooping drops untrusted packets containing Option 82 or non-zero GIADDR fields; Sticky Port Security writes learned MACs to running-config (requiring manual saving for persistence); and DHCP Snooping rate limiting places interfaces in an err-disabled state upon threshold violations.

Adım Adım Çözüm

1
Analyze Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) operation on untrusted interfaces.
DAI inspects all incoming ARP packets on untrusted ports and compares the sender MAC address and sender IP address against valid entries in the DHCP snooping binding database.
This prevents man-in-the-middle ARP spoofing attacks across Layer 2 VLANs.
2
Analyze DHCP Snooping Option 82 untrusted port enforcement.
DHCP snooping drops incoming packets on untrusted interfaces if the packet contains Option 82 information or a non-zero GIADDR value.
Untrusted access ports are intended for end hosts, which should not generate relay agent information fields.
3
Analyze sticky MAC address persistence in Port Security.
Configuring sticky MAC learning adds dynamically discovered MAC addresses into the active running-configuration.
Because these MAC addresses reside only in running-config, administrators must save the configuration (`copy running-config startup-config`) to make them permanent across switch reboots.
4
Analyze DHCP Snooping Rate Limiting behavior.
Enforcing `ip dhcp snooping limit rate` places an untrusted interface in the `err-disabled` state if incoming DHCP frames exceed the configured rate limit.
This protects switch CPU resources and DHCP infrastructure against denial-of-service starvation attacks.

Anahtar Kavram

Layer 2 Security Feature Operations and Verification (DAI, DHCP Snooping, Port Security)
Soru 38Soru

In enterprise Cisco switch implementations, Layer 2 security controls govern frame processing, metadata insertion, and hardware lookup behaviors. Match each Layer 2 security operation or feature context to its exact functional mechanism.

Soldaki öğeye tıklayın, sonra eşleşen sağdaki öğeye tıklayın

Öğeler

Port Security Restrict Violation Mode
Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) Payload Validation
DHCP Snooping Option 82 Insertion
DAI ARP Access Control List (ARP ACL) Inspection Filter

Eşleşmeler

Cevabı ve açıklamayı göster

Cevap

Port Security Restrict Violation Mode matches with dropping frames, incrementing violation counters, and logging syslogs without err-disabling the port. Dynamic ARP Inspection Payload Validation matches with intercepting ARP packets on untrusted ports and inspecting payload sender IP/MAC pairs against bindings. DHCP Snooping Option 82 Insertion matches with appending relay agent circuit/remote ID metadata to client requests on untrusted ports. DAI ARP ACL Inspection Filter matches with evaluating static IP-to-MAC rules prior to checking the DHCP snooping database.
Each feature pair matches its fundamental operational behavior. Port Security restrict mode drops frames and logs alerts without placing the port in err-disabled status. DAI inspects inner ARP payload fields on untrusted ports against the binding database. DHCP Snooping Option 82 appends relay agent sub-options to requests arriving on untrusted ports. DAI ARP ACL filters allow manually configured static IP-to-MAC checks before querying dynamic DHCP bindings.

Adım Adım Çözüm

1
Analyze Port Security Restrict Violation Mode
Identify that restrict mode drops unauthorized frames, increments the violation counter, and generates SNMP/syslog alerts while maintaining interface link state up/up.
Differentiates restrict mode from protect mode (which drops silently without logging) and shutdown mode (which disables the interface).
2
Analyze Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) Payload Validation
Identify that DAI inspects the inner ARP payload fields (sender MAC and sender IP) on untrusted ports against the DHCP snooping binding database.
Prevents ARP poisoning attacks by verifying MAC-to-IP resolution integrity at Layer 2.
3
Analyze DHCP Snooping Option 82 Insertion
Identify that Option 82 appends circuit ID and remote ID sub-options to DHCP requests on untrusted ports before forwarding toward trusted DHCP servers.
Enables upstream DHCP servers to apply localized IP allocation policies based on switch port location.
4
Analyze DAI ARP ACL Inspection Filter
Identify that ARP ACLs provide static mapping validation override prior to falling back to the dynamic DHCP snooping binding database lookup.
Required to prevent DAI from dropping valid ARP packets generated by static IP assigned hosts that lack DHCP lease entries.

Anahtar Kavram

Operational mechanics of Layer 2 security features including Port Security violation handling, DHCP Snooping Option 82 insertion, DAI payload validation, and ARP ACL filtering.
Soru 39Soru

A network administrator executes the commands `ip dhcp snooping` and `ip arp inspection vlan 10` on a Cisco Catalyst switch to mitigate Layer 2 ARP spoofing attacks. However, users on VLAN 10 immediately lose all network connectivity because Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) drops all incoming ARP requests from client ports. Executing `show ip dhcp snooping binding` displays an empty binding table. Which command was omitted from the switch configuration?

Cevabı ve açıklamayı göster

Cevap: ip dhcp snooping vlan 10

Cevap

The missing command is 'ip dhcp snooping vlan 10'. Enabling DHCP Snooping globally is a two-step process: global activation followed by VLAN-specific activation.
Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) depends directly on the DHCP snooping binding database to inspect and validate ARP traffic arriving on untrusted ports. On Cisco Catalyst switches, turning on DHCP snooping globally using `ip dhcp snooping` does not activate DHCP snooping on any VLAN by default. The administrator must also issue `ip dhcp snooping vlan 10` to inspect DHCP packets on VLAN 10 and dynamically build the binding database.

Adım Adım Çözüm

1
Analyze DAI dependencies
DAI inspects incoming ARP requests on untrusted ports by comparing sender IP and MAC addresses against valid entries in the Layer 2 DHCP snooping binding table.
Without valid entries in the binding database, DAI treats all incoming ARP requests on untrusted interfaces as invalid and drops them.
2
Identify the missing DHCP snooping feature configuration
Executing 'ip dhcp snooping' globally enables the feature framework on the switch, but snooping remains disabled on all VLANs until 'ip dhcp snooping vlan <vlan-id>' is configured.
Because VLAN 10 was not explicitly enabled for DHCP snooping, host lease requests were not intercepted, the binding table remained empty, and DAI dropped legitimate host ARP traffic.

Anahtar Kavram

DAI reliance on the DHCP Snooping Binding Database
Tahmini Süre:1m 30s
Soru 40Soru

A network administrator configures an access port on a Cisco Catalyst switch using the commands `switchport port-security` and `switchport port-security mac-address sticky`. A host connects to the port, and its MAC address is dynamically learned and written to the running configuration. Shortly after, the switch experiences an unexpected reboot due to a brief power failure, before `copy running-config startup-config` or `write memory` was executed. What happens to the learned sticky MAC address on this interface after the switch completes its boot sequence?

Cevabı ve açıklamayı göster

Cevap: The learned sticky MAC address is lost from memory, and the switch port dynamically learns the MAC address of the first frame received post-reboot.

Cevap

The learned sticky MAC address is lost from RAM, causing the port to dynamically re-learn the MAC address of the next device that transmits frames on the link.
Enabling sticky MAC learning (`switchport port-security mac-address sticky`) automatically adds dynamically learned MAC addresses into the volatile `running-config` stored in RAM. If the switch reboots before `copy running-config startup-config` is executed, the learned MAC entries are lost, and the port will learn the MAC address of the next frame transmitted post-reboot.

Adım Adım Çözüm

1
Analyze how sticky MAC address learning operates in Cisco IOS.
When `switchport port-security mac-address sticky` is enabled, dynamically learned MAC addresses are converted into static-like entries added directly into the switch's `running-config` in RAM.
This avoids manual MAC address entry while retaining MAC restrictions during current uptime.
2
Evaluate the effect of a switch reboot without saving the running configuration.
Because RAM is volatile memory, any modifications to `running-config` that were not saved to `startup-config` in NVRAM (via `copy running-config startup-config`) are cleared upon reboot.
The startup configuration restored at boot lacks the dynamically added sticky MAC statement.
3
Determine the state of the interface after rebooting.
The port remains operational with sticky port security enabled, but its learned sticky MAC list is empty, allowing it to learn a new sticky MAC address from incoming frames.
The underlying port security feature configuration remains in startup-config, but the learned operational data was lost.

Anahtar Kavram

Port Security Sticky MAC Address Persistence
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Layer 2 Security Features (Port Security, DHCP Snooping, DAI) Alıştırma Soruları — Cisco CCNA — Sayfa 2 | Examkin