A network administrator is implementing hardening controls on an enterprise core switch following a security audit. The audit report flagged two primary vulnerabilities: administrative monitoring data and CLI sessions are being transmitted without payload encryption, and untagged management traffic is exposed to potential VLAN hopping attacks across 802.1Q trunk lines. Which set of device hardening configurations directly remediates both identified security risks?
- Migrate network monitoring to SNMPv3 using the authPriv security level, enforce SSH for CLI administration, and reassign the native VLAN on all 802.1Q trunks to an unused non-default VLAN ID.Cevap
- BConfigure SNMPv2c with restricted read-only community strings, enable Telnet over TCP port 22, and retain VLAN 1 as the native VLAN across all trunk connections.
- CImplement SNMPv3 configured with noAuthNoPriv security level, enforce SSH for remote access, and map the native VLAN on all trunk links to the active user access VLAN.
- DEnable HTTPS for web management, deploy SNMPv3 with authNoPriv security level, and prune VLAN 1 from all trunk allowed lists while leaving the native VLAN undefined.
Cevap
Migrate network monitoring to SNMPv3 using the authPriv security level, enforce SSH for CLI administration, and reassign the native VLAN on all 802.1Q trunks to an unused non-default VLAN ID.
The correct configuration combines SNMPv3 at the authPriv security level (which provides cryptographic authentication and AES payload encryption) with SSH (which encrypts CLI management traffic). Additionally, reassigning the native VLAN on 802.1Q trunk links from default VLAN 1 to a dedicated, unused VLAN ID prevents untagged traffic leakage and mitigates double-tagging VLAN hopping attacks.
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Anahtar Kavram
Management Plane Hardening & Native VLAN Isolation
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