During an internal penetration test, an analyst connects a laptop to a standard user access port on a Managed Layer 2 switch. Without deploying double-encapsulated 802.1Q tags or compromising any credentials, the analyst crafts specific control frames that force the switch port into an active trunking state. This allows the laptop to send and receive traffic across multiple restricted VLANs. Which attack vector was exploited to breach VLAN isolation, and what is the primary mitigation step required to prevent it?
- Dynamic Trunking Protocol (DTP) exploitation; mitigate by explicitly setting switch ports to static access mode and disabling negotiation.Cevap
- BAddress Resolution Protocol (ARP) poisoning; mitigate by enabling Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) and binding DHCP snooping tables.
- CDNS Cache Poisoning; mitigate by enforcing DNSSEC records and locking UDP port 53 outbound traffic.
- D802.1Q Double-Tagging; mitigate by changing the native VLAN ID on trunk links to match the target access VLAN ID.
Cevap
Dynamic Trunking Protocol (DTP) exploitation; mitigate by explicitly setting switch ports to static access mode and disabling negotiation.
The correct answer identifies Dynamic Trunking Protocol (DTP) exploitation. When switch access ports are left in default dynamic modes (such as dynamic auto or desirable), an attacker sending spoofed DTP frames can trick the switch into forming an 802.1Q trunk. This grants the attacker access to all VLANs traversing that trunk. Hardcoding access ports statically (`switchport mode access`) and explicitly disabling DTP (`switchport nonegotiate`) prevents this vulnerability.
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Anahtar Kavram
VLAN Hopping via Dynamic Trunking Protocol (DTP) Exploitation and Switch Port Hardening