Soru

Passage A
The persistence of "legal fictions"—assumptions of fact recognized by courts to be false, such as the notion that a corporation is a "person" or that an 'attractive nuisance' implies a landowner's invitation to trespassing children—is often misunderstood by laypersons and legal purists alike as mere judicial obfuscation. In reality, these fictions are indispensable mechanisms for common law evolution. When faced with unprecedented societal or technological circumstances where the strict application of existing precedent would yield clearly inequitable results, courts employ fictions to intuitively bridge the gap between archaic rules and modern necessities. This pragmatic approach allows the law to adapt organically without the destabilizing shock of suddenly overturning established doctrines. By preserving the outward form and vocabulary of precedent, legal fictions maintain the structural continuity that is absolutely essential to the rule of law. The alternative is deeply impractical: waiting for legislative bodies, which are notoriously slow, heavily bureaucratic, and frequently paralyzed by partisan gridlock, to comprehensively modernize statutory frameworks. Relying solely on this legislative mechanism would routinely leave vulnerable litigants without timely or equitable redress. Thus, the legal fiction operates not to deceive the public, but to facilitate immediate justice within the rigid structural constraints of historical jurisprudence.

Passage B
The increasing judicial reliance on legal fictions represents a profound, albeit subtle, threat to the foundational integrity of democratic legal systems. Proponents routinely defend these artificial constructs as necessary, pragmatic workarounds for outdated laws, arguing that they serve the immediate interests of justice when the legislature lags behind societal change. However, this utilitarian defense fundamentally misapprehends the constitutional separation of powers. When a judge utilizes a legal fiction to stretch a statute or precedent far beyond its original, textually apparent meaning, the judge is not merely interpreting the law; they are quietly and unilaterally legislating from the bench. This practice is inherently deceptive because it deliberately masks the true policy considerations driving the court's decision under the guise of established precedent. If a law is genuinely inadequate for modern contexts, the proper remedy in a democratic society is rigorous legislative reform, regardless of how cumbersome, slow, or inefficient that process might be. When judges use fictions to circumvent this process in the name of swift equity, they successfully insulate the law from public accountability and democratic debate. Furthermore, legal fictions inevitably breed jurisprudential incoherence. Because these rulings are fundamentally untethered from factual reality, they provide no predictable, logical principles for future cases, ironically undermining the very systemic stability their proponents claim they preserve. True stability in the law requires absolute transparency, where judicial reasoning is explicitly articulated rather than obscured by artificial constructs.

Based on the passages, which of the following best describes how the author of Passage B would most likely respond to the assertion in Passage A that relying solely on legislative bodies to modernize laws would "routinely leave litigants without timely or equitable redress"?