Soru

The doctrine of cy-près has long occupied a foundational position within the Anglo-American law of charitable trusts. Originating in equity jurisprudence, cy-près—derived from the Norman French cy près comme possible, meaning "as near as possible"—empowers a court to modify the terms of a charitable trust when compliance with the settlor's original stipulated purpose becomes impossible, impracticable, or unlawful. Historically, legal scholars justified this equitable intervention as a delicate equilibrium: it honored testamentary intent by redirecting resources toward closely related philanthropic ends, while simultaneously preventing the socially destructive lock-in of dead-hand control.

However, the structural landscape of modern philanthropy has placed severe strain on this classical framework. The rapid expansion of donor-advised funds (DAFs) and pooled philanthropic intermediaries over the past three decades has displaced the traditional single-settlor testamentary trust. Under the DAF model, institutional sponsoring organizations aggregate contributions from thousands of living donors into centralized, non-perpetual endowments. When individual sub-accounts within these intermediaries become dormant, orphaned, or legally contested, attempting to discern and reconstruct the precise subjective intent of individual donors becomes an exercise in legal fiction, creating profound administrative bottlenecks and protracted evidentiary disputes.

In response to these institutional realities, several contemporary law and economics scholars have proposed abandoning intent-based cy-près entirely in favor of an unconstrained social-utility maximization standard. Under this proposed regime, dormant or impracticable philanthropic assets would be automatically reallocated by administrative regulators or equity courts to whichever accredited charitable initiatives offer the highest measurable public return on investment. Proponents assert that replacing subjective historical intent with objective welfare criteria eliminates costly litigation, prevents capital stagnation, and aligns philanthropic assets with urgent contemporary societal needs.

Yet this purely utilitarian replacement rests on a flawed conception of charitable governance. By treating philanthropic capital as an undifferentiated public asset subject to state redistribution, the utilitarian model overlooks the crucial expressive and pluralistic function of private giving. Donors participate in charitable endeavors precisely because giving allows them to support distinctive moral, cultural, or local commitments that majoritarian political processes frequently neglect. Divorcing asset reallocation from institutional and communal proximity risks eroding the civic motivation that fuels private philanthropy in the first place. A more principled reform must neither cling to fictitious subjective intent nor succumb to central welfare reallocation. Instead, courts should adopt a structured presumptive framework that channels dormant funds to geographically and functionally proximate community organizations, thereby harmonizing administrative efficiency with the pluralistic integrity essential to charitable enterprise.

Based on the passage's overall argument and central thesis, match each paragraph of the passage to its precise structural function in developing the author's primary purpose.