Soru

Read the following passage carefully.

For much of the mid-twentieth century, antitrust jurisprudence in the United States was guided by a structuralist presumption: market concentration was inherently suspect, regardless of its immediate effect on consumer prices. Proponents of this view argued that decentralized markets were essential not merely for economic vitality, but for the preservation of democratic institutions against the creeping influence of corporate oligarchy. While one can appreciate the structuralists’ noble commitment to economic democracy and recognize the historical forces that shaped their anxieties, their legal framework was ultimately undermined by a glaring lack of economic rigor. By reflexively condemning consolidation, the structuralist approach often penalized the very economies of scale that drive technological innovation and deliver tangible benefits to the public.

The ascendance of the Chicago School in the 1970s effectively dismantled this structuralist orthodoxy. Armed with sophisticated price theory, Chicago School scholars argued persuasively that antitrust law should serve one master: consumer welfare, defined almost exclusively as allocative efficiency. This paradigm shift injected a much-needed dose of empirical discipline into antitrust enforcement, replacing subjective political calculations with measurable economic metrics. However, this theoretical rigor came at a steep cost. By reducing the sprawling, multi-dimensional problem of market power to a simple calculus of short-term price effects, the Chicago School exhibited a reductive myopia. It entirely dismissed the profound political and social externalities generated by massive corporate consolidation, treating the concentration of private power as a non-issue so long as aggregate output remained high.

Today, a resurgent "neo-Brandeisian" movement seeks to depose the Chicago School and resurrect the political dimensions of antitrust law. These scholars rightly identify the democratic hazards posed by contemporary tech monopolies, and their underlying anxiety about unchecked private power is both timely and incontrovertible. Yet, when one examines the actual legal mechanisms the neo-Brandeisians propose, significant cracks begin to show. Their attempt to codify vague political goals into actionable antitrust standards threatens to plunge regulatory enforcement into unpredictable chaos. It is one thing to acknowledge that monopolies wield undue political influence; it is quite another to expect antitrust judges to reliably balance "democratic integrity" against "efficiency" in a merger trial. Ultimately, while the neo-Brandeisian critique highlights genuine blind spots in the current orthodoxy, their prescribed legal framework remains worryingly unworkable, threatening to replace a flawed but predictable system with an administrative quagmire.

Based on the passage, match each target of the author's commentary with the description that most accurately reflects the author's attitude toward it.