Read the following two passages regarding the philosophy of science and the epistemic status of scientific theories.
Passage A
The remarkable predictive success of modern scientific theories cannot be dismissed as mere coincidence. Scientific realism posits that our best, most mature scientific theories are at least approximately true descriptions of both the observable and unobservable aspects of the world. When a theory successfully predicts a novel phenomenon—such as the bending of starlight by massive objects or the existence of a new subatomic particle—it is highly improbable that the theory is fundamentally false yet miraculously produces such precise empirical predictions. Therefore, the theoretical entities posited by these theories, from electrons to spacetime curvature, must genuinely exist in the mind-independent world. To deny this is to render the overarching success of the scientific enterprise a completely inexplicable miracle. The realist framework insists that science fundamentally aims for absolute truth, and its progressive accumulation of predictively successful theories is compelling evidence that it is gradually uncovering the actual underlying structure of reality, rather than merely cataloging observable regularities.
Passage B
Constructive empiricism offers a more modest and epistemologically secure account of the scientific enterprise, avoiding the sweeping metaphysical commitments demanded by realism. According to this view, the objective of science is not to uncover the absolute truth about unobservable reality, but rather to develop theories that are "empirically adequate." A theory is empirically adequate if what it says about observable phenomena is true—that is, if it successfully "saves the phenomena." When a theory successfully predicts novel events, this success merely confirms its empirical adequacy, not the underlying literal truth of its postulated unobservable entities. The history of science is littered with predictively successful theories—such as the caloric theory of heat or the luminiferous aether—whose unobservable entities were later universally discarded. Thus, inferring the actual existence of unobservable entities solely from a theory's predictive success is a logically perilous leap unjustified by the available evidence. We can embrace a scientific theory as practically useful, structurally robust, and completely adequate for guiding empirical inquiry without committing to the dogmatic belief that its theoretical constructs map onto hidden, unobservable realities.
Based on the perspectives presented in the passages, match each assertion derived from Passage A (on the left) with the most likely response or evaluation from the author of Passage B (on the right).
- The predictive success of modern scientific theories would be an inexplicable miracle if those theories did not accurately describe unobservable reality.This specific inference is undermined by the history of science, which features numerous frameworks that yielded highly accurate predictions while relying on unobservable elements that were later discarded.
- The scientific enterprise fundamentally aims to discover the absolute truth about both the observable and unobservable aspects of the world.This assigns a needlessly sweeping metaphysical objective to a discipline whose actual, more modest goal is simply to ensure that its theories are empirically adequate.
- Because they are essential to theories that make precise predictions, theoretical entities such as electrons and spacetime curvature must genuinely exist.This represents an unjustified dogmatic commitment regarding specific theoretical components, since such constructs can be fully embraced for their practical utility without confirming their actual existence.