Soru

Passage A
In contemporary philosophy of science, the traditional view of scientific theories as objective photographs of an independent reality has been largely supplanted by the paradigm of model-dependent realism. This epistemological framework posits that it is strictly meaningless to ask whether a given theoretical model is absolutely "real" in an ontological sense; rather, one can only legitimately ask whether its internal logic corresponds to empirical observations. Because our brains inherently interpret sensory input by constructing simplified mental models of our environment, any advanced scientific theory is fundamentally just a formal, mathematical extension of this basic cognitive habit. Consequently, if two competing theoretical models accurately predict the exact same physical phenomena, neither model can be philosophically declared to be more "true" or authentic than the other. The arbitration between them becomes a purely pragmatic exercise, dictated entirely by subjective criteria such as mathematical elegance, conceptual convenience, or computational simplicity. A scientific model is thus best understood not as a perfect mirror held up to nature, but rather as a utilitarian conceptual map designed specifically to navigate it. By permanently abandoning the illusory quest for absolute ontology, model-dependent realism liberates working scientists to freely adopt whichever mathematical formalism proves most expedient for a given experimental domain, explicitly accepting the paradox that multiple, mutually exclusive models might simultaneously and validly describe the exact same universe.

Passage B
While the recent philosophical shift toward model-dependent realism correctly highlights the constructed, inherently mediated nature of scientific knowledge, it risks descending into a corrosive epistemic relativism that fundamentally ignores the actual historical trajectory of scientific progress. It is undoubtedly true that human beings can access reality only through the proxy of conceptual models, but this cognitive limitation does not logically imply that all empirically adequate models are epistemologically equal. The rigorous criteria for evaluating scientific frameworks must necessarily extend far beyond mere predictive equivalence to include vital dimensions such as explanatory depth and consilience—which is defined as the unique capacity of a theory to unify logically disparate domains of empirical knowledge. Consider, for example, the historical transition from the semi-classical Bohr model of the atom to the fully realized quantum mechanical model. For a significant period, both theoretical frameworks could predict the discrete emission spectra of hydrogen gas with highly comparable accuracy. However, the quantum mechanical framework was ultimately elevated by the scientific community not merely because of some arbitrary computational convenience, but primarily because it provided a robust, mathematically rigorous architecture that seamlessly integrated with both molecular chemistry and solid-state physics. To blithely assert that the choice between such profound theoretical frameworks is purely a matter of pragmatic, subjective taste is to willfully overlook the rigorous, objective constraints that empirical reality consistently imposes on our conceptual structures. Thus, while we must indeed abandon the naive realism of the past, we must nevertheless fiercely maintain a hierarchical epistemology wherein scientific models are definitively ranked by their structural fidelity to the underlying, invisible causal mechanisms they attempt to describe.

Based on the logical structure and relationship between the two passages, arrange the following argumentative moves in the sequential order in which they appear, moving from the beginning of Passage A to the conclusion of Passage B.