Soru

Read the following passage carefully.

The legal doctrine of *cy pres*—from the Norman French *cy pres comme possible*, meaning "as near as possible"—has historically functioned as a conservative mechanism within the law of charitable trusts. Traditionally, when the original objective of a charitable trust became legally or physically impossible to execute, courts employed *cy pres* to modify the terms of the trust. Crucially, however, this modification was strictly constrained by the requirement to approximate the testator’s original, specific intent as closely as feasible. The animating philosophy was one of testamentary freedom: the law respected the autonomy of the donor to direct their property post-mortem, intervening only when absolute necessity dictated, and even then, only to salvage the donor's underlying philanthropic vision.

In recent decades, however, judicial application of *cy pres* has undergone a quiet but profound transformation. Rather than restricting modifications to cases of strict impossibility, contemporary courts increasingly invoke the doctrine when a trust’s original purpose is merely deemed "impracticable" or "inefficient." This relaxed standard has permitted judges to redirect substantial trust assets away from their historically mandated targets and toward broader, contemporary social initiatives. For instance, funds originally earmarked for the eradication of specific, now-cured diseases have been rerouted not to related medical research, but to general public health infrastructure or even educational access programs, reflecting a judicial preference for maximizing current social utility over adherence to historical mandates.

This expansive approach has generated substantial friction among legal formalists. Critics of the modern trend argue that the fundamental bedrock of trust law is the inviolability of the donor's intent. By transforming *cy pres* from a doctrine of necessity into a tool for judicial policymaking, courts substitute their own socio-political preferences for those of the property owner. Furthermore, these critics warn of a looming macroeconomic consequence: if prospective donors perceive that their carefully calibrated philanthropic directives will be casually rewritten by future jurists to align with prevailing political currents, the incentive to establish perpetual charitable trusts will be severely diminished, ultimately reducing the total quantum of private wealth dedicated to public benefit.

Conversely, proponents of the expanded *cy pres* doctrine emphasize the inherent friction between "dead-hand control" and the evolving needs of a dynamic society. They argue that charitable trusts, which enjoy significant tax exemptions and exist in perpetuity, are effectively quasi-public entities. From this perspective, allowing vast sums of capital to remain locked in antiquated, hyper-specific directives—such as a 19th-century trust dedicated to the maintenance of horse-drawn carriage paths—represents a gross misallocation of societal resources. For these advocates, the judiciary’s willingness to repurpose funds toward pressing modern exigencies is not a usurpation of donor intent, but a necessary modernization of trust law to ensure that perpetual endowments serve the perpetual public good.

Based on the passage, match each specific premise or evidentiary detail (Left) to its structural function in constructing the author's unstated overarching thesis regarding the evolution of trust law (Right).