Soru

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The doctrine of "odious debt" in international law posits a controversial exception to the general principle of state succession, which dictates that a successor state inherits the sovereign debt of its predecessor. First formalized in 1927 by Russian legal theorist Alexander Nahum Sack, the doctrine asserts that if a despotic power incurs debt not for the needs or in the interest of the state, but to strengthen its despotic regime or repress the populace, that debt is "odious." Consequently, it does not bind the nation; it is considered a personal debt of the regime that falls with its demise. Sack delineated three strict conditions for a debt to be classified as odious: the debt must have been incurred without the consent of the people, it must have been spent in a manner contrary to their interests, and the creditors must have been aware of these facts at the time the loan was issued.

Despite its intuitive moral appeal, the status of the odious debt doctrine as customary international law remains heavily contested. Proponents frequently cite the 1898 peace treaty negotiations between the United States and Spain following the Spanish-American War as an early, albeit informal, articulation of the principle. The United States refused to assume the "Cuban debt" incurred by Spain, arguing that the loans were imposed upon the Cuban people without their consent and were utilized to finance Spain's efforts to brutally suppress Cuban uprisings. Spain eventually acquiesced, marking a prominent instance where state practice seemingly aligned with the concept of odious debt.

However, legal scholar Olamide Taiwo cautions against overextending the historical significance of the 1898 negotiations. Taiwo emphasizes that while the United States employed rhetoric resonant with the odious debt concept, its refusal to assume the debt was primarily a function of its superior bargaining power as the military victor, rather than a capitulation by Spain to a recognized legal obligation. Furthermore, Taiwo observes that in the century since Sack formalized the doctrine, international tribunals and state practices have been remarkably reluctant to explicitly invoke it to repudiate sovereign debt. Instead, successor governments have overwhelmingly chosen to honor debts incurred by previous authoritarian regimes, often prioritizing the maintenance of favorable credit ratings and access to international capital markets over the moral vindication offered by debt repudiation.

According to Taiwo, the modern reluctance to invoke the doctrine stems largely from the inherent subjectivity of Sack's criteria. Determining what constitutes the "interest of the state" is an inherently political calculus, and proving a creditor's awareness of a regime's malicious intent at the time of lending presents formidable evidentiary hurdles. Therefore, Taiwo argues that absent a universally recognized, independent adjudicatory body empowered to evaluate such claims, the doctrine of odious debt functions less as a binding legal mechanism and more as a rhetorical instrument used selectively in geopolitical negotiations.

Based on the passage, what does Taiwo explicitly assert regarding the 1898 peace treaty negotiations between the United States and Spain?