Read the following passage:
In the classical formulation of customary international law, the binding nature of a norm requires both uniform state practice and *opinio juris sive necessitatis*—the subjective belief that such practice is legally mandated. However, modernist scholars increasingly argue that in the realm of international human rights, the traditional sequence is inverted. Modernist tribunals often derive the existence of state practice primarily from overwhelming declarations of *opinio juris*, effectively rendering the material practice of states secondary. To justify this methodological shift, proponents frequently invoke the "crystallization" theory, asserting that multilateral treaties can instantaneously codify nascent customs. Yet, this theoretical maneuver arguably conflates the aspiration of international norms with their empirical realization, thereby bypassing the historical requirement that a rule must be demonstrably lived by states before it can constrain them.
Based on this text, the author's observation that the modernist theoretical maneuver "conflates the aspiration of international norms with their empirical realization" functions primarily to provide a justification for why international human rights norms are permitted to bypass the traditional requirement of material state practice.
Cevap: Cevap