Soru

Passage:
In nineteenth-century British admiralty jurisprudence, the law of maritime salvage underwent significant formalization under successive High Court judges seeking to define the precise boundaries of salvage remuneration. Under traditional maritime law, salvage was conceived as a voluntary service rendered to save maritime property from peril. However, judicial opinions throughout the century clarified several key constraints. In The Neptune (1824), Lord Stowell established that crew members are legally barred from claiming salvage rewards for preserving their own ship, reasoning that seamen are bound by their preexisting employment contract to exert every effort in emergencies. Two decades later, in The Zephyrus (1842), Dr. Stephen Lushington ruled that salvage compensation cannot be awarded for mere unconsummated intent; if a potential rescuer's tender of assistance produces no actual or tangible contribution to the vessel's preservation, no salvage lien arises. Subsequently, in The Charlotte (1848), the court determined that the element of peril does not necessitate absolute or imminent physical destruction, but rather requires only a well-grounded apprehension of serious danger. Finally, the scope of salvageable subject matter was circumscribed in The Gas Float Whitton No. 2 (1897), wherein the House of Lords held that salvage claims attach exclusively to navigable vessels and the cargo laden thereon, explicitly denying salvage rights to parties who recovered an unmanned, non-navigable floating gas beacon. Together, these rulings transformed discretionary maritime awards into a structured legal framework based on strict contractual boundaries, demonstrable benefit, reasonable peril, and vessel navigability.

Based on the passage, match each admiralty case with the specific legal rule explicitly attributed to it in the text.