Soru

In contemporary cognitive science, the "extended mind" thesis posits that cognitive processes are not strictly bounded by the biological skull but can encompass external environmental features. A proponent of this view argues that when an individual relies on a smartphone to recall the location of a restaurant, the device and its memory function as a constituent part of the individual's cognitive architecture, rather than acting merely as an external causal aid. The central argument hinges on the "parity principle." This principle asserts that if a part of the world functions as a process which, were it done in the head, we would have no hesitation in recognizing as part of the cognitive process, then that external entity is legitimately part of the cognitive process.

Critics, however, contend that this framework expands the definition of cognition to an absurd degree, leading to "cognitive bloat." They argue that biological neural processes possess unique intrinsic properties—most notably, conscious awareness and non-derived intentionality—that technological artifacts fundamentally lack. From the critics' standpoint, the fact that an external object can store information is insufficient; true cognition requires an internal subjective dimension that a silicon chip cannot replicate.

In defense against this critique, proponents of the extended mind thesis maintain that focusing on these intrinsic biological properties arbitrarily privileges the physical medium of thought over its functional role. They assert that what matters for a process to be considered cognitive is its functional integration into the organism's problem-solving routines and the causal role it plays in governing subsequent behavior. Therefore, they conclude, since the smartphone memory plays the exact same causal role in directing the individual's steps to the restaurant as biological memory would—operating reliably, accessibly, and automatically—it must be recognized as a genuine extension of the mind.

This functionalist perspective ultimately demands a radical reconceptualization of human agency. By uncoupling cognition from strictly biological substrates, the extended mind theorists imply that human beings are best understood as dynamically shifting brain-body-environment systems. The traditional boundaries of the "self" are thus seen as porous and contingent upon the specific tools an individual incorporates into their daily functioning. When the physical location of information processing becomes theoretically irrelevant, the ethical implications regarding personal identity and responsibility become increasingly complex, forcing a reevaluation of what it means to be an autonomous agent.

The conclusion drawn by the proponents of the extended mind thesis in the third paragraph logically depends on which one of the following assumptions?