Passage A
Under Anglo-American tort law, civil liability typically requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence—conventionally interpreted as a greater than 50 percent probability that the defendant caused the plaintiff’s injury. Yet courts have consistently balked at imposing liability based exclusively on "naked" statistical evidence. In the classic hypothetical, a pedestrian is struck by an unidentified transit bus in a municipality where Company X operates 85 percent of all buses. Despite the mathematical probability comfortably exceeding the preponderance threshold, courts routinely dismiss such claims absent specific corroborating evidence. This judicial reluctance is fundamentally sound: mere demographic or market-share frequency does not establish an individualized causal relationship. Statistical probability describes what is true of a population in the aggregate, but adjudication is an individualized endeavor demanding an explanatory account of what actually transpired in the specific instance. Imposing liability on statistical distribution alone converts tort adjudication into an arbitrary actuarial tax on market share.
Passage B
The prevailing legal skepticism toward statistical evidence rests on a fragile epistemological foundation. Critics contend that statistical data lacks an "individualized" character, yet all evidentiary proof is fundamentally probabilistic. Eyewitness testimony, long venerated by juries, is inherently governed by statistical error rates; an eyewitness with an 80 percent track record of accuracy provides evidence that is logically indistinguishable from an 80 percent base-rate frequency. The judicial insistence on a narrative of particularized causation merely privileges subjective narrative coherence over quantifiable reliability. By rejecting rigorous probabilistic data while embracing notoriously fallible observational testimony, the legal system tolerates higher rates of factual error under the guise of individualized justice. When statistical evidence reliably demonstrates that the probability of a defendant’s culpability surpasses the statutory threshold, refusing to assign liability undermines the very accuracy that civil fact-finding claims to pursue.
Based on the passages, the authors of Passage A and Passage B disagree on which one of the following points?
- AWhether eyewitness testimony in tort litigation is subject to an inherent margin of error.
- BWhether civil liability in Anglo-American tort law is formally evaluated under the preponderance of the evidence standard.
- Whether aggregate statistical probabilities alone can serve as a sufficient basis for determining liability in a civil lawsuit.Cevap
- DWhether criminal standards of proof should be systematically revised to match civil probability thresholds.
- EWhether mathematical probability metrics should completely eliminate subjective judicial deliberation in all legal disputes.