Soru

The following passage is an excerpt from a scholarly article discussing the relationship between customary international law (CIL) and domestic courts.

The relationship between customary international law (CIL) and domestic constitutional frameworks remains a persistent vexation in modern jurisprudence. Traditionally, scholars have gravitated toward "Strict Dualism," a doctrine positing that international norms possess no domestic legal force absent explicit legislative incorporation. While Strict Dualism offers a seductively clean theoretical demarcation, its utility is utterly compromised by the realities of modern transnational litigation; it is anachronistic to the point of irrelevance, relying on a hermetically sealed conception of the nation-state that ceased to exist a century ago.

In response to Dualism's obsolescence, a cadre of scholars has championed the "Monist Revival," arguing that CIL is intrinsically binding on domestic courts precisely because constitutional systems are nested within a higher international legal order. One must admire the moral ambition of the Revivalists, and their historical excavation of early common law is undeniably impressive. Yet, their central prescriptive claim—that domestic judges ought to automatically subordinate constitutional text to evolving global norms—strains credulity. Their model relies on an idealized vision of international consensus that rarely materializes, rendering their framework intellectually elegant but practically unworkable.

A more cynical reaction to Dualism's decline is found in "Democratic Sovereignty Theory," which asserts that since international norms are forged by unelected diplomats and tribunals, their domestic application inherently circumvents the democratic process. As a normative theory of law, this argument relies on a reductive caricature of how both international and domestic law are actually formulated. Nevertheless, one cannot entirely discount the theorists' central descriptive insight: whatever its legal merits, the judicial application of CIL routinely triggers intense political backlash that threatens the institutional legitimacy of domestic courts. To ignore this political reality, as many internationalists do, is perilous.

Finally, a nascent movement offers the "Pragmatic Translation Approach," which suggests that CIL should inform domestic law not as a binding external mandate, but as an interpretive canon for resolving constitutional ambiguities. This framework deftly navigates the tension between global integration and democratic legitimacy. It is not without its flaws—its reliance on judicial discretion risks inconsistency across jurisdictions—but it currently represents the most sophisticated and intellectually rigorous mechanism for mediating the interface between domestic and international legal regimes. The approach does not solve the underlying theoretical friction, but it manages the friction with a grace that other theories lack.

Based on the passage, match each jurisprudential approach to the description that most accurately characterizes the author's attitude toward it.