Soru

The following excerpt is drawn from a scholarly critique of a recent movement in environmental law:

In his treatise on ecological jurisprudence, Aris Thorne advocates for conferring full constitutional personhood upon ecosystems, positing that watersheds and forests possess intrinsic standing in appellate courts. One cannot help but admire the moral ambition underpinning Thorne’s framework; it supplies a compelling ethical corrective to the anthropocentric commodification of natural resources. Yet, when one attempts to superimpose Thorne’s ontological claims onto the rigid procedural machinery of tort law, the conceptual architecture begins to fray. By conflating moral patienthood with legal agency, Thorne inadvertently glosses over the intractable evidentiary hurdles of establishing ecological injury without relying on a human proxy. Thus, while his paradigm admirably shifts the boundaries of our cultural discourse, it ultimately functions better as a philosophical provocation than as a viable schematic for actionable litigation.

Which of the following two-word phrases most accurately captures the author’s overall attitude toward Thorne’s proposed legal framework?