The 'extended mind thesis' (EMT) in cognitive science posits that the physical boundary of the skull is an arbitrary limit for defining the architecture of the human mind. According to EMT, external tools—such as a notebook used by an individual with memory impairment—should be classified as active parts of the cognitive system, provided they are reliably and seamlessly integrated into the individual's problem-solving routines. Critics, however, reject this claim by pointing to the lack of 'intrinsic intentionality' in external objects. They argue that while neural states have inherent meaning and drive actions directly, a notebook contains only passive symbols that require an agent's internal mind to interpret them. In response, EMT proponents challenge the premise of this distinction. They argue that many of the internal, unconscious processes universally accepted as cognitive also lack active, conscious interpretation at any given moment. Consequently, proponents argue, if external tools are disqualified from cognitive status solely because their symbols are passive, a consistent application of this standard would also force critics to disqualify a vast portion of the brain's internal operations.
Which of the following statements best describes how proponents of the extended mind thesis (EMT) counter the critics' objection regarding 'intrinsic intentionality'?
- denying cognitive status to external tools based on a lack of active interpretation would, if applied consistently, also require the disqualification of many internal neural processes.Answer
- Bexternal representations are merely passive symbols that must be interpreted by an agent's internal mind to achieve cognitive significance.
- Cexternal tools like notebooks are reliably and seamlessly integrated into an individual's daily problem-solving routines.
- Dinternal mental states and external tools both possess identical levels of conscious, active intentionality during cognitive tasks.