Layer 2 Security Features (Port Security, DHCP Snooping, DAI)

48 questions

Question 1Question

Match each Layer 2 security feature on the left with its primary mitigation purpose or operation on the right.

Click a left item, then click its matching right item

Items

Port Security
DHCP Snooping
Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI)

Matches

Show answer & explanation

Answer

Port Security matches limiting ingress traffic based on source MAC addresses. DHCP Snooping matches filtering untrusted DHCP messages and building the IP-to-MAC binding database. Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) matches intercepting and verifying ARP packets against a binding database to prevent ARP poisoning.
Each feature secures a distinct Layer 2 operation: Port Security controls MAC-level access, DHCP Snooping filters DHCP traffic while tracking legitimate IP-MAC assignments, and DAI utilizes those assignments to drop spoofed ARP frames.

Step-by-Step Solution

1
Identify the role of Port Security.
Port Security operates at the MAC layer to restrict ingress traffic based on authorized source MAC addresses.
It prevents unauthorized devices from attaching to a switch port.
2
Identify the role of DHCP Snooping.
DHCP Snooping blocks unauthorized DHCP servers and records valid IP-to-MAC address assignments in its binding database.
It ensures rogue DHCP servers cannot distribute invalid network configurations and provides binding context for other features.
3
Identify the role of Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI).
DAI inspects ARP packets and uses the DHCP snooping binding database to validate ARP requests and responses.
It prevents man-in-the-middle attacks caused by malicious ARP poisoning or spoofing.

Key Concept

Layer 2 Security Features (Port Security, DHCP Snooping, DAI)
Question 2Question

An enterprise network topology consists of Access-Switch-1 linked via trunk interface GigabitEthernet1/0/24 to Distribution-Switch-1, where the network DHCP server resides. DHCP Snooping is enabled globally and on VLAN 20 across both switches. End hosts connected to access ports on Access-Switch-1 fail to acquire dynamic IPv4 addresses. System logs on Distribution-Switch-1 indicate that incoming DHCP Discover packets arriving on interface GigabitEthernet1/0/24 are being dropped upon arrival. Which configuration oversight is the root cause of these packet drops?

Show answer & explanation

Answer: Interface GigabitEthernet1/0/24 on Distribution-Switch-1 remains untrusted for DHCP Snooping, causing it to drop incoming DHCP client requests that contain Option 82 information inserted by Access-Switch-1.

Answer

Interface GigabitEthernet1/0/24 on Distribution-Switch-1 remains untrusted for DHCP Snooping, causing it to drop incoming DHCP client requests that contain Option 82 information inserted by Access-Switch-1.
When DHCP Snooping is active, access switches append DHCP Option 82 (Relay Agent Information) to client requests. If an upstream switch receives a DHCP packet containing Option 82 on a port that is still in the default untrusted state, the switch drops the packet because untrusted ports are not allowed to receive DHCP packets with relay information when giaddr is 0.0.0.0. Designating the trunk interface as trusted using 'ip dhcp snooping trust' resolves the drops.

Step-by-Step Solution

1
Analyze DHCP Snooping default behaviors on Cisco Catalyst access switches.
When DHCP Snooping is enabled globally, Cisco switches automatically insert DHCP Option 82 relay agent information into client DHCP requests originating on untrusted access ports before forwarding them upstream.
Option 82 adds circuit ID and remote ID details to assist DHCP servers with address allocation and policy enforcement.
2
Evaluate the receiving switch interface trust state.
By default, all switch ports (including 802.1Q trunks) are untrusted for DHCP Snooping until explicitly configured with the 'ip dhcp snooping trust' command.
Untrusted ports drop incoming DHCP packets containing non-zero Option 82 data when the gateway address (giaddr) is 0.0.0.0 to prevent DHCP spoofing.
3
Identify the corrective action required on the inter-switch trunk link.
Configuring 'ip dhcp snooping trust' on interface GigabitEthernet1/0/24 of Distribution-Switch-1 allows DHCP requests with Option 82 to pass through to the central DHCP server.
Trunk links pointing toward legitimate network infrastructure and DHCP servers must be designated as trusted interfaces.

Key Concept

DHCP Snooping Option 82 untrusted interface validation rules
Question 3Question

Match each Cisco Layer 2 security feature to its primary function in mitigating network attacks.

Click a left item, then click its matching right item

Items

Port Security
DHCP Snooping
Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI)

Matches

Show answer & explanation

Answer

Port Security pairs with restricting MAC addresses allowed on an interface. DHCP Snooping pairs with filtering rogue DHCP server packets and maintaining the DHCP binding database. Dynamic ARP Inspection pairs with validating ARP packets against the DHCP binding database.
Port Security controls frame forwarding by restricting access to specified MAC addresses. DHCP Snooping protects against rogue DHCP servers and creates the IP-to-MAC binding table. Dynamic ARP Inspection inspects ARP packets against this binding table to stop ARP poisoning.

Step-by-Step Solution

1
Determine the primary operational role of Port Security.
Port Security restricts interface access based on learned or configured MAC addresses.
It prevents unauthorized devices from attaching to switch ports and limits MAC flooding.
2
Determine the primary operational role of DHCP Snooping.
DHCP Snooping acts as a L2 firewall between untrusted hosts and DHCP servers.
It drops unauthorized DHCP server offers on untrusted ports and populates the IP-to-MAC binding table.
3
Determine the primary operational role of Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI).
DAI inspects ARP packets on untrusted switch interfaces.
It uses the binding database established by DHCP Snooping to validate ARP requests and responses, mitigating man-in-the-middle attacks.

Key Concept

Layer 2 Security Features (Port Security, DHCP Snooping, DAI)
Question 4Question

A network engineer deploys Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) and DHCP Snooping on VLAN 30 of a Cisco Catalyst switch. A workstation connected to an untrusted access port is configured with a static IPv4 address rather than obtaining one via DHCP. When the workstation attempts to communicate with the default gateway, all of its traffic is dropped at the switch port. Which command sequence should be configured on the switch to permit ARP traffic from this statically configured host while maintaining DAI protection?

Show answer & explanation

Answer: Define an ARP access list matching the static IP and MAC address, then apply it using the command ip arp inspection filter <ACL_NAME> vlan 30.

Answer

Define an ARP access list matching the static IP and MAC address, then apply it using the command ip arp inspection filter <ACL_NAME> vlan 30.
Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) intercept and validates all ARP requests and responses on untrusted ports against the DHCP snooping binding database. For hosts configured with static IP addresses, no entry exists in the DHCP binding database, causing DAI to drop their ARP packets. To permit static hosts while keeping DAI active, administrators must create an ARP access list defining the static IP-to-MAC pair and apply it globally to the VLAN using the command 'ip arp inspection filter <ACL_NAME> vlan <VLAN_ID>'.

Step-by-Step Solution

1
Identify why traffic from the statically addressed host is being dropped.
DAI drops ARP packets received on untrusted ports if the IP-to-MAC mapping is absent from the DHCP snooping binding database.
Statically configured hosts do not participate in DHCP exchanges, so they lack entries in the DHCP snooping table.
2
Determine the Cisco IOS mechanism to manually permit static IP-to-MAC bindings in DAI.
An ARP Access Control List (ARP ACL) must be created containing the host's static IP and MAC address.
ARP ACLs provide a static fallback validation mechanism for DAI.
3
Apply the ARP ACL to the target VLAN.
Executing 'ip arp inspection filter <ACL_NAME> vlan 30' binds the ARP ACL to VLAN 30.
This instructs DAI to check incoming ARP packets against the static ARP ACL before consulting the DHCP binding database.

Key Concept

DAI Static ARP ACL Integration
Estimated Time:1m 30s
Question 5Question

An administrator hardens interface GigabitEthernet1/0/5 on a Cisco Catalyst switch by executing `switchport port-security`, `switchport port-security maximum 2`, and `switchport port-security mac-address sticky`. During business hours, two authorized workstations connect to the switch port and successfully transmit data. However, following a scheduled power outage that causes an ungraceful switch reload, users report that connecting the exact same workstations to GigabitEthernet1/0/5 triggers a security violation, placing the port into an err-disabled state. Inspection via `show port-security interface gigabitEthernet1/0/5` shows a Total MAC Addresses count of 0. Which administrative oversight directly caused this loss of MAC address bindings?

Show answer & explanation

Answer: The administrator failed to execute `copy running-config startup-config` after the sticky MAC addresses were dynamically learned into the active configuration.

Answer

The administrator failed to save the running configuration to NVRAM after the sticky MAC addresses were dynamically learned.
When port security is configured with the `mac-address sticky` feature, learned MAC addresses are dynamically added to the switch's volatile running configuration (RAM). If the administrator does not save the running configuration to the startup configuration using `copy running-config startup-config` or `write memory`, any switch reload or power cycle will restore the previous startup configuration, losing all dynamically learned sticky MAC addresses. Consequently, when endpoints reconnect after the reboot, the switch sees them as unknown MAC addresses, resulting in a port security violation.

Step-by-Step Solution

1
Analyze the operational mechanics of sticky MAC address learning.
When `switchport port-security mac-address sticky` is configured, the switch dynamically learns connected MAC addresses up to the configured maximum and appends them as `switchport port-security mac-address sticky <MAC>` lines directly into the running configuration in RAM.
Understanding where sticky MAC addresses are stored during runtime is critical to diagnosing reboot persistence issues.
2
Evaluate the effect of an ungraceful switch reload on volatile memory (RAM).
Because running-config resides in RAM, any switch reboot or reload clears all unsaved runtime entries unless they have been explicitly saved to startup-config in NVRAM.
If `copy running-config startup-config` (or `write memory`) is not executed, the running configuration reverts to the last saved startup configuration upon reload, removing all learned sticky MAC entries.
3
Correlate MAC count 0 and port security violation after reboot.
With 0 sticky MAC addresses saved, the switch treats the returning endpoints as unrecognized devices. Because maximum allowed MACs was reached or default security policies triggered, the incoming frames violate port security, driving the port into err-disabled state.
Confirms that missing configuration persistence in NVRAM is the root cause of the violation.

Key Concept

Port Security Sticky MAC Address Persistence
Estimated Time:2m 0s
Question 6Question

A network administrator enables Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) on a switch access VLAN to mitigate ARP spoofing attacks. Which database does DAI consult by default to validate ARP requests and responses received on untrusted ports?

Show answer & explanation

Answer: The DHCP snooping binding database

Answer

The DHCP snooping binding database
Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) is designed to prevent man-in-the-middle ARP spoofing attacks. When DAI is enabled on a VLAN, it intercepts all ARP requests and responses on untrusted ports and checks the sender IP address and sender MAC address against valid entries in the DHCP snooping binding database. If the IP-to-MAC binding does not match an entry in the database, the invalid ARP packet is dropped.

Step-by-Step Solution

1
Identify the primary function of Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI)
DAI mitigates ARP poisoning/spoofing by intercepting and validating ARP requests and responses on untrusted switch ports.
Untrusted ports can receive malicious ARP messages attempting to misassociate IP addresses with attacker MAC addresses.
2
Determine the data source used by DAI for validation
DAI compares the sender IP address and MAC address in intercepted ARP packets against valid IP-to-MAC pairs.
DHCP Snooping dynamically builds and maintains the binding database containing MAC address, IP address, lease time, binding type, VLAN number, and interface information.

Key Concept

Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) operational dependency on DHCP Snooping
Question 7Question

When DHCP snooping is enabled globally on a Cisco switch, what default trust state is assigned to all Layer 2 interfaces across the switch?

Show answer & explanation

Answer: Untrusted

Answer

Untrusted is the default trust state assigned to all switch interfaces when DHCP snooping is enabled.
When DHCP snooping is enabled, all interfaces default to an untrusted state. Untrusted interfaces can send DHCP requests but are prohibited from forwarding DHCP server responses like DHCP OFFER, ACK, or NAK packets.

Step-by-Step Solution

1
Identify the global default operational mode of DHCP snooping upon activation on a Cisco switch.
DHCP snooping classifies switch interfaces into two operational categories: trusted and untrusted.
Security features operate under the principle of least privilege, defaulting to untrusted to immediately filter unverified DHCP responses.
2
Determine the default status of switch ports.
All Layer 2 switch ports start as untrusted ports.
Only designated ports connected to legitimate DHCP servers or network uplink switches should be manually set to trusted using the 'ip dhcp snooping trust' command.

Key Concept

DHCP Snooping Interface Trust States
Estimated Time:45s
Question 8Question

A network technician configures port security on an access switch interface using the command `switchport port-security mac-address sticky`. Which TWO statements accurately describe how sticky MAC address learning operates on this interface?

Select all that apply

Show answer & explanation

Answer: Dynamically learned MAC addresses are automatically added to the active running configuration file.; Learned sticky MAC addresses will be lost if the switch reboots before the running configuration is saved.

Answer

Dynamically learned MAC addresses are automatically added to the active running configuration file, and learned sticky MAC addresses will be lost if the switch reboots before the running configuration is saved.
Enabling sticky MAC learning allows switch interfaces to convert dynamically learned MAC addresses into sticky MAC addresses and append them directly to the active running configuration. Because these entries reside in volatile memory, saving the running configuration to the startup configuration is required to maintain the learned addresses after a reboot.

Step-by-Step Solution

1
Analyze the function of sticky MAC address learning in Cisco IOS Port Security.
When 'mac-address sticky' is configured, the switch dynamically learns connected MAC addresses and automatically converts them into sticky entries in RAM.
Sticky MAC learning dynamically writes learned addresses into the running configuration so administrators do not have to enter them manually.
2
Determine the memory persistence of the running configuration.
The running configuration exists in volatile RAM and is erased upon device reboot unless explicitly saved to NVRAM.
To persist sticky MAC addresses across switch reboots, an administrator must execute 'copy running-config startup-config'.

Key Concept

Port Security Sticky MAC Address Dynamics and Configuration Persistence
Estimated Time:1m 0s
Question 9Question

A network administrator configures Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) on VLAN 10 of a Cisco Catalyst switch to prevent ARP spoofing. DHCP snooping is enabled and functioning properly. However, several servers connected to untrusted access ports use statically assigned IP addresses, causing DAI to drop their legitimate ARP requests because they lack entries in the DHCP snooping binding database. Which configuration action should the administrator perform to permit ARP traffic from these static servers while maintaining DAI protection on VLAN 10?

Show answer & explanation

Answer: Configure an ARP Access Control List (ARP ACL) with static IP-to-MAC bindings and apply it to VLAN 10 using the ip arp inspection filter command.

Answer

Configure an ARP Access Control List (ARP ACL) with the static IP-to-MAC address mappings of the servers and apply it to VLAN 10 using the 'ip arp inspection filter' command.
Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) validates ARP requests and responses against the DHCP snooping binding database on untrusted ports. Because statically configured hosts do not send DHCP requests, they lack entries in the binding database. To prevent DAI from dropping legitimate traffic from these static hosts, administrators must create an ARP Access Control List (ARP ACL) with static IP-to-MAC mappings and map it to the VLAN using the 'ip arp inspection filter' command.

Step-by-Step Solution

1
Identify the cause of dropped ARP packets
DAI inspects ARP packets on untrusted ports by matching their IP and MAC addresses against the DHCP snooping binding database. Statically addressed hosts have no entries in this database, causing DAI to drop their packets.
DAI relies by default on the DHCP snooping binding table for validation.
2
Determine the correct mitigation mechanism for static IP hosts
Cisco IOS allows creating an ARP ACL (`arp access-list`) containing explicit `permit ip host <IP> mac host <MAC>` statements for static hosts.
ARP ACLs act as a static reference database alongside DHCP snooping for DAI validation.
3
Apply the ARP ACL to Dynamic ARP Inspection
Execute `ip arp inspection filter <arp-acl-name> vlan 10` in global configuration mode.
This command instructs DAI to check the ARP ACL before or instead of the DHCP snooping database for traffic on VLAN 10.

Key Concept

Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) Static Host Validation via ARP ACLs
Question 10Question

A network administrator wants to restrict access on a switch port to an authorized end device. If an unauthorized MAC address sends traffic to the port, the interface must drop the frames, avoid incrementing the security violation counter, and avoid disabling the port. Which port security violation mode meets this requirement?

Show answer & explanation

Answer: protect

Answer

The protect violation mode silently drops packets from unknown MAC addresses without incrementing the security violation counter or placing the interface into an err-disabled state.
The protect violation mode silently drops packets with unauthorized source MAC addresses. It does not increment the interface's security violation counter, nor does it send SNMP traps or Syslog notifications.

Step-by-Step Solution

1
Analyze the operational requirements
The requirement specifies dropping unauthorized frames silently without raising violation counters or bringing down the link.
Port security violation modes differ in how they react to unauthorized MAC addresses.
2
Evaluate Port Security violation mode options
Protect mode drops frames silently without counter increments. Restrict mode drops frames but logs violations and increments counters. Shutdown mode err-disables the interface.
Matching the behavior to the protect keyword fulfills all prompt criteria.

Key Concept

Port Security Violation Modes (Protect, Restrict, Shutdown)
Question 11Question

An enterprise network administrator configures Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) on VLAN 10 using the command `ip arp inspection vlan 10`. Host devices dynamically receiving IPv4 configuration via DHCP operate without issue. However, a critical server connected to access switchport GigabitEthernet0/2 in VLAN 10 is configured with a static IPv4 address (192.168.10.50/24192.168.10.50/24) and MAC address (0011.2233.44550011.2233.4455). Network telemetry indicates that all network traffic from this server is dropped because DAI marks its ARP packets as invalid. Which configuration step correctly resolves the ARP packet drop for this static host while maintaining active DAI protection on VLAN 10?

Show answer & explanation

Answer: Define an ARP access list matching the server's IP and MAC address, then apply it to VLAN 10 using the `ip arp inspection filter` command.

Answer

Define an ARP access list matching the server's IP and MAC address, then apply it to VLAN 10 using the `ip arp inspection filter` command.
Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) intercepts and validates all ARP packets on untrusted switch interfaces against the DHCP snooping binding database. Statically addressed hosts do not use DHCP and therefore lack entries in this database, causing DAI to discard their ARP traffic. To resolve this issue without disabling DAI, an administrator must create an ARP access list (`arp access-list`) defining the static IP and MAC address pairing, and associate it with the VLAN using `ip arp inspection filter <acl-name> vlan <vlan-id>`.

Step-by-Step Solution

1
Diagnose the root cause of packet drops under Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI)
DAI intercepts ARP requests and responses on untrusted ports and validates the sender's IP-to-MAC mapping against the DHCP snooping binding database. Because the server uses a static IP address, no DHCP transaction occurred, resulting in no database entry and subsequent ARP packet drops.
Static IP devices naturally lack dynamic entries in the switch DHCP snooping binding database.
2
Identify the Cisco IOS mechanism for authorizing non-DHCP static hosts under DAI
Define an ARP Access Control List (`arp access-list <name>`) and add a permit entry binding the host's static IP (192.168.10.50192.168.10.50) to its MAC address (0011.2233.44550011.2233.4455).
ARP ACLs provide a static verification table for DAI validation.
3
Apply the static ARP ACL to the VLAN inspection filter
Execute `ip arp inspection filter <acl-name> vlan 10` in global configuration mode.
This permits the static host's ARP packets to pass inspection while preserving DAI security enforcement for all other hosts in VLAN 10.

Key Concept

Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) Static ARP Access List Filtering
Question 12Question

Match each Layer 2 security mechanism or feature component on the left with its corresponding operational behavior on the right.

Click a left item, then click its matching right item

Items

DHCP Snooping Binding Database
Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI)
Port Security Sticky MAC Learning
DAI Interface Rate Limiting

Matches

Show answer & explanation

Answer

DHCP Snooping Binding Database maps to tracking client MAC, IP, lease, VLAN, and interface details. Dynamic ARP Inspection matches intercepting and validating IP-to-MAC bindings in ARP packets on untrusted ports. Port Security Sticky MAC Learning matches dynamically converting learned MAC addresses into running configuration entries. DAI Interface Rate Limiting matches enforcing a maximum threshold of incoming ARP packets per second.
Each feature component directly performs its specified security role: DHCP Snooping creates the authoritative binding database; DAI utilizes that database to validate ARP packets on untrusted interfaces; Sticky MAC learning writes dynamically learned MACs into the running configuration; and DAI rate limiting protects switch hardware by capping incoming ARP frames per second.

Step-by-Step Solution

1
Analyze the operational function of DHCP Snooping.
DHCP snooping acts as a firewall between untrusted hosts and DHCP servers, building a binding database containing IP address, MAC address, lease time, bind type, VLAN number, and interface information.
This database serves as the authoritative mapping reference for other Layer 2 features such as DAI and IP Source Guard.
2
Analyze the operational function of Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI).
DAI inspects ARP packets on untrusted interfaces to prevent ARP poisoning and man-in-the-middle attacks.
DAI discards invalid ARP packets where the Sender IP and Sender MAC do not match an entry in the DHCP snooping binding database.
3
Analyze the function of sticky MAC learning in Port Security.
Sticky MAC learning dynamically converts learned MAC addresses into sticky addresses that are automatically added to the running-config file.
This eliminates the need to manually enter static MAC addresses on switchports while maintaining MAC persistence across reboots if saved.
4
Analyze DAI interface rate limiting.
Enforcing an ARP rate limit drops excess ARP packets when incoming packet rates exceed the configured threshold per second.
Rate limiting protects the switch CPU from control plane starvation caused by ARP flooding attacks.

Key Concept

Layer 2 Security Feature Operation and Interdependencies
Question 13Question

An network administrator is troubleshooting traffic drops on switch port GigabitEthernet1/0/10. The interface is configured with Layer 2 security features including DHCP Snooping, Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI), and Port Security in restrict mode. The output of `show ip dhcp snooping binding` displays a valid IP-to-MAC entry for the connected client on GigabitEthernet1/0/10. However, executing `show port-security interface g1/0/10` shows that the `SecurityViolation` counter is actively incrementing every time the host attempts to transmit data, while the port status remains operational (`secure-up`). Which scenario accounts for these symptoms?

Show answer & explanation

Answer: The host interface card was recently replaced, generating a new source MAC address that causes a Port Security violation while DHCP successfully issued a lease for the new MAC.

Answer

The host interface card was recently replaced, generating a new source MAC address that causes a Port Security violation while DHCP successfully issued a lease for the new MAC.
The correct answer accounts for both symptoms: a valid DHCP Snooping entry and an incrementing Port Security violation counter. When a host NIC is replaced, the new MAC address successfully requests a DHCP lease (creating a valid DHCP Snooping database entry and allowing DAI validation to pass). However, because Port Security was configured with sticky MAC learning or a explicit MAC limit, the newly introduced MAC address violates port security parameters. In restrict mode, Port Security drops non-matching frames and increments the SecurityViolation counter without disabling the port.

Step-by-Step Solution

1
Analyze the reported operational symptoms
Port status is secure-up, SecurityViolation counter is incrementing, and DHCP Snooping binding table contains a valid entry.
Identify which security feature is actively dropping traffic.
2
Evaluate Port Security violation mode behavior
Restrict mode drops frames from unauthorized source MAC addresses, increments the violation counter, and logs a Syslog message while keeping the interface up.
The incrementing violation counter indicates Port Security is triggering, not DAI or DHCP Snooping.
3
Correlate DHCP Snooping binding presence with Port Security failure
The host successfully completed a DHCP exchange (populating the binding table), but its source MAC address does not match the statically or dynamically learned sticky MAC address on the port security database.
A replaced network interface card generates a new MAC address. DHCP Snooping will grant an IP and record the new MAC, but Port Security will block the frame if the maximum MAC address limit or specific sticky MAC entry is exceeded.

Key Concept

Port Security violation modes and multi-feature Layer 2 security interaction
Estimated Time:2m 0s
Question 14Question

A network administrator is deploying Layer 2 security controls on a Cisco Catalyst switch. Which two statements accurately describe the operational requirements and default behaviors of DHCP Snooping? (Select two.)

Select all that apply

Show answer & explanation

Answer: DHCP server messages such as DHCP OFFER and DHCP ACK are dropped when received on untrusted ports.; DHCP snooping must be enabled globally on the switch as well as explicitly enabled for target VLANs.

Answer

DHCP server response messages (OFFER/ACK) received on untrusted interfaces are dropped, and DHCP snooping requires both global enablement and VLAN-specific configuration.
DHCP snooping categorizes switch interfaces into trusted and untrusted states. By default, all ports are untrusted and drop DHCP server responses (such as OFFER and ACK) to prevent rogue DHCP servers. Additionally, enabling the feature requires both global activation ('ip dhcp snooping') and VLAN-specific activation ('ip dhcp snooping vlan').

Step-by-Step Solution

1
Determine default port trust behavior for DHCP Snooping.
When DHCP snooping is enabled, all switch interfaces default to an untrusted state. Untrusted ports block incoming DHCP server response messages (OFFER, ACK, LEASEQUERY) to prevent rogue DHCP server attacks.
Restricting server traffic on user-facing access ports is the primary security function of DHCP snooping.
2
Identify mandatory switch configuration steps.
DHCP snooping requires global activation using the 'ip dhcp snooping' command in global configuration mode, as well as enabling the feature on specific VLANs via 'ip dhcp snooping vlan <vlan-id>'.
Both global and VLAN configuration commands are necessary for the switch to begin inspecting DHCP traffic.

Key Concept

DHCP Snooping Operational Rules and Port Trust Behavior
Question 15Question

A network administrator configures switchport port security on a Cisco Catalyst switch access port using the command 'switchport port-security mac-address sticky'. An end device is connected to the port, and the switch dynamically learns its MAC address into the running configuration. The administrator verifies full network connectivity, but does not enter any additional CLI commands before the switch undergoes an unexpected reboot. Which outcome occurs regarding the port security bindings after the switch reboots?

Show answer & explanation

Answer: The dynamically learned sticky MAC address is lost, requiring the switch to relearn the address upon new traffic arrival.

Answer

The dynamically learned sticky MAC address is lost, requiring the switch to relearn the address upon new traffic arrival.
When port security is configured with sticky MAC address learning, the switch automatically converts dynamically learned MAC addresses into sticky secure MAC addresses and places them into the running configuration in volatile RAM. Because the running configuration was not saved to NVRAM prior to the switch reboot, all dynamically added sticky MAC entries are erased, requiring the switch to relearn host MAC addresses once traffic resumes.

Step-by-Step Solution

1
Analyze how sticky MAC addresses function in switch memory.
Sticky MAC addresses learned by port security are appended directly to the active running configuration stored in RAM.
The switch dynamic sticky learning feature acts as a shortcut to add static configuration lines into running-config without manual MAC typing.
2
Evaluate the effect of a switch reboot when running configuration has not been saved.
RAM contents are lost during a reboot, reverting the switch to the startup configuration stored in NVRAM.
Without executing 'copy running-config startup-config' or 'write memory', any dynamically learned sticky MAC entries are purged.

Key Concept

Port Security Sticky MAC Persistence
Estimated Time:1m 15s
Question 16Question

A network engineer completes the configuration of Layer 2 security features on a Cisco Catalyst switch connecting client workstations to an upstream router. After enabling DHCP snooping and Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) globally and on VLAN 20, client devices on untrusted access ports fail to obtain IPv4 addresses from the DHCP server, and ARP packets arriving from the default gateway on interface GigabitEthernet0/1 are discarded by DAI. Which two configuration steps are required on interface GigabitEthernet0/1 to resolve these issues? (Select two.)

Select all that apply

Show answer & explanation

Answer: Configure `ip dhcp snooping trust` on interface GigabitEthernet0/1 to allow incoming DHCP server offer and acknowledgment messages.; Configure `ip arp inspection trust` on interface GigabitEthernet0/1 to bypass DAI validation for incoming ARP traffic from the router.

Answer

Configure `ip dhcp snooping trust` and `ip arp inspection trust` on interface GigabitEthernet0/1.
When DHCP snooping and DAI are enabled on a VLAN, interfaces default to an untrusted state. Uplink interfaces connected to legitimate DHCP servers and routers must be configured as trusted using `ip dhcp snooping trust` and `ip arp inspection trust` so server replies and gateway ARP messages are permitted.

Step-by-Step Solution

1
Identify the cause of DHCP packet drops on uplink GigabitEthernet0/1.
By default, all switch interfaces are untrusted when DHCP snooping is enabled, causing the switch to drop incoming DHCP server reply messages (OFFER/ACK). Setting `ip dhcp snooping trust` on GigabitEthernet0/1 permits these responses.
Client ports require an authorized path to receive DHCP leases from the server.
2
Identify the cause of ARP packet drops on uplink GigabitEthernet0/1.
By default, DAI treats all ports as untrusted and intercepts all ARP traffic for validation against the DHCP snooping binding table. Setting `ip arp inspection trust` on GigabitEthernet0/1 bypasses this check for legitimate router ARP messages.
Router ARP packets arriving from the core network might not exist in the local DHCP snooping binding table and will be dropped unless the interface is trusted.

Key Concept

Layer 2 Security Interface Trust States for DHCP Snooping and DAI
Estimated Time:1m 30s
Question 17Question

A network engineer hardens an enterprise access switch by enabling DHCP Snooping, Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI), and Port Security. Host A acquires an IPv4 address dynamically via DHCP on interface GigabitEthernet1/0/5, where Port Security is configured with the `switchport port-security mac-address sticky` command. The engineer executes `write memory` to save the running configuration. Later, the switch experiences a power outage and reboots. DHCP Snooping database persistence was not configured with `ip dhcp snooping database`. Upon bootup, Host A attempts to communicate using its active DHCP lease without re-initiating a DHCP DORA sequence. However, all ARP traffic from Host A is dropped by the switch. What is the root cause of these frame drops?

Show answer & explanation

Answer: The DHCP snooping binding table was stored in volatile RAM and cleared upon reboot, leaving Dynamic ARP Inspection with no valid IP-to-MAC binding entry to validate Host A's ARP traffic.

Answer

The DHCP snooping binding database was stored in volatile RAM and cleared upon reboot, leaving Dynamic ARP Inspection with no valid IP-to-MAC binding entry to validate Host A's ARP traffic.
Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) relies directly on the DHCP Snooping binding database to validate ARP requests and responses arriving on untrusted ports. By default, the binding table is kept in volatile RAM. If database persistence is not configured via `ip dhcp snooping database <url>`, a switch reload erases all binding entries. When Host A retains its existing IP assignment without issuing a new DHCP request after the switch reboots, DAI finds no matching IP-to-MAC mapping in the binding table and drops Host A's ARP packets.

Step-by-Step Solution

1
Analyze the operational dependency between Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) and DHCP Snooping.
DAI inspects ARP packets on untrusted ports by matching their source IP and MAC addresses against the active DHCP Snooping binding table.
DAI cannot make forwarding decisions without a valid binding entry or a manually configured ARP ACL.
2
Evaluate the storage location and persistence of the DHCP Snooping database.
By default, the DHCP Snooping binding table is maintained exclusively in volatile system RAM unless `ip dhcp snooping database` is configured with a persistent URL (such as flash or TFTP/FTP).
A switch reload flushes volatile memory, completely erasing all dynamically learned bindings.
3
Correlate post-reboot client behavior with DAI validation logic.
Because Host A did not perform a new DHCP exchange after the reboot, no new entry was written to the restored empty binding table. DAI compared Host A's ARP traffic against the empty table and dropped the frames.
Saving the running configuration with `write memory` preserves CLI settings and sticky MACs, but it does not store dynamic DHCP Snooping binding database entries.

Key Concept

DAI and DHCP Snooping Database Persistence
Question 18Question

A network engineer is analyzing connectivity failures on a Cisco Catalyst switch serving VLAN 20. DHCP Snooping and Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) are globally enabled and configured on VLAN 20. Users connected to access ports report that they fail to receive DHCP IP addresses, valid ARP requests from hosts are dropped by the switch engine, and port-security sticky MAC addresses learned on access port GigabitEthernet0/2 were lost following a switch reboot.

Which TWO administrative actions are required to resolve the DHCP/DAI packet drops and permanently persist the learned sticky MAC addresses across switch reboots? (Select TWO.)

Select all that apply

Show answer & explanation

Answer: Configure `ip dhcp snooping trust` and `ip arp inspection trust` on trunk interface GigabitEthernet0/1 connected to the DHCP server and default gateway.; Execute `copy running-config startup-config` after sticky MAC addresses have been dynamically learned into the running configuration.

Answer

The administrator must trust the uplink trunk port for both DHCP Snooping and Dynamic ARP Inspection, and save the running configuration to the startup configuration so dynamically learned sticky MAC addresses persist across reboots.
Configuring trust settings (`ip dhcp snooping trust` and `ip arp inspection trust`) on the uplink interface allows authorized DHCP responses and ARP packets from the default gateway to pass without being dropped. Additionally, executing `copy running-config startup-config` saves the dynamically learned sticky MAC addresses from RAM into NVRAM, ensuring they persist after a switch reload.

Step-by-Step Solution

1
Identify the cause of DHCP and ARP drops on the uplink trunk interface.
By default, all switch ports are untrusted when DHCP Snooping and DAI are enabled. Untrusted ports block incoming DHCP server responses (OFFER/ACK) and inspect all ARP packets against the DHCP snooping binding database. Because the gateway router ARP responses and DHCP offer packets arrive on untrusted uplink GigabitEthernet0/1, the switch drops them.
Uplink ports connected to authorized infrastructure (DHCP server, default gateway router) must be designated as trusted using `ip dhcp snooping trust` and `ip arp inspection trust`.
2
Determine why sticky MAC addresses were lost on GigabitEthernet0/2 after a reload.
Port security sticky MAC addresses are dynamically learned and written directly to the active `running-config` in volatile RAM. They are not automatically copied to NVRAM startup memory.
Executing `copy running-config startup-config` (or `write memory`) is mandatory after sticky MAC addresses are learned to preserve them in NVRAM across device reboots.

Key Concept

Layer 2 Security Trust Boundaries and Configuration Persistence
Question 19Question

A network administrator is implementing Layer 2 security controls on a Cisco Catalyst access switch to defend against rogue DHCP servers, ARP poisoning, and unauthorized MAC address access. Match each Layer 2 security configuration command or feature component on the left to its corresponding operational behavior on the right.

Click a left item, then click its matching right item

Items

DHCP Snooping Binding Database
switchport port-security violation restrict
ip arp inspection validate src-mac
ip dhcp snooping trust

Matches

Show answer & explanation

Answer

DHCP Snooping Binding Database matches storing dynamically learned client MAC-to-IP bindings from untrusted interfaces to validate DHCP and ARP traffic. 'switchport port-security violation restrict' matches dropping unauthorized frames, incrementing the violation counter, and sending syslog alerts without shutting down the interface. 'ip arp inspection validate src-mac' matches checking that the Ethernet header source MAC matches the ARP payload sender MAC. 'ip dhcp snooping trust' matches designating an interface allowed to receive DHCP server responses like DHCP OFFER and ACK.
The correct pairings align each command or component to its exact technical operation under Cisco IOS Layer 2 security. DHCP Snooping Binding Database stores client MAC-to-IP mappings. Restrict mode drops offending traffic while logging alerts. DAI src-mac validation compares Ethernet header MAC with ARP payload MAC. Interface DHCP snooping trust allows server messages through uplink ports.

Step-by-Step Solution

1
Analyze DHCP Snooping Database role
Identify that the binding database stores client IP, MAC, VLAN, and port mapping collected from untrusted ports during DHCP transactions.
This database serves as the authoritative source for validating future IP traffic and ARP inspection requests.
2
Evaluate Port Security Restrict mode behavior
Differentiate restrict mode from protect mode (which drops quietly without logging) and shutdown mode (which disables the port).
Restrict mode drops non-matching MAC frames while generating a log notification and incrementing the violation counter.
3
Examine DAI src-mac validation criteria
Recognize that 'ip arp inspection validate src-mac' explicitly verifies header consistency between Ethernet source MAC and ARP payload sender MAC.
This prevents spoofed MAC attacks where the frame header MAC differs from the internal ARP packet contents.
4
Determine DHCP Snooping Trust configuration requirement
Associate interface-level 'ip dhcp snooping trust' with permitting server-originated messages.
Untrusted ports drop DHCP server packets (OFFER, ACK) by default to prevent rogue DHCP server insertion.

Key Concept

Layer 2 Security Features (Port Security, DHCP Snooping, DAI)
Question 20Question

A network engineer is configuring Layer 2 security controls on access switches to protect against man-in-the-middle attacks and rogue server deployments. Which two statements accurately describe the operational behaviors of DHCP Snooping and Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI)? (Select two.)

Select all that apply

Show answer & explanation

Answer: By default, switch interfaces are in an untrusted state for both features, requiring incoming traffic on access ports to be validated against the binding database.; Dynamic ARP Inspection intercepts, logs, and discards ARP packets on untrusted ports that fail IP-to-MAC binding verification.

Answer

Switch interfaces default to an untrusted state for both features requiring binding database validation, and Dynamic ARP Inspection intercepts and drops invalid ARP packets received on untrusted ports.
Both DHCP Snooping and Dynamic ARP Inspection default all switch ports to an untrusted state, ensuring that unverified DHCP server messages and invalid ARP packets on access ports are intercepted and validated against the binding database. When DAI processes incoming ARP requests or responses on an untrusted port, it compares the packet's IP and MAC address pairing with the database, dropping any packets that do not match.

Step-by-Step Solution

1
Analyze default port trust state for Layer 2 security features
Confirm that interfaces default to untrusted for both DHCP Snooping and Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI).
Defaulting access interfaces to untrusted ensures that unauthorized DHCP responses and unverified ARP packets are inspected.
2
Evaluate Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) packet processing logic
Identify that DAI intercepts ARP packets on untrusted ports and validates the IP-to-MAC binding.
Packets with invalid or missing bindings in the DHCP snooping table are dropped to prevent ARP poisoning.
3
Evaluate distractor statements regarding configuration persistence and trunking
Rule out non-persistent sticky MAC behavior and unrelated native VLAN mismatch claims.
Sticky MAC addresses reside in volatile RAM running-config until saved, and DAI does not fix native VLAN mismatch errors.

Key Concept

Layer 2 Security Port Trust States and DAI Binding Validation
Page 1 / 3Next