An energy utility enterprise recently deployed 50,000 smart grid sensors that transmit operational telemetry data to a central management server over encrypted TLS connections. During an independent security audit, analysts discover that while TLS 1.2 is enforced, the server accepts finite-field Diffie-Hellman key exchanges configured with legacy 512-bit prime parameters. Which cryptographic vulnerability does this configuration represent, and what risk does it present to the enterprise?
- Weak key exchange implementation allowing an attacker to precompute discrete logarithms and decrypt TLS session keysAnswer
- BImproper selection of asymmetric algorithms for bulk data payload encryption, causing processing bottlenecks on edge sensors
- CFlawed Certificate Signing Request submission flow leading to automatic approval of self-signed root certificates on grid endpoints
- DInadequate network perimeter firewall filtering failing to inspect application-layer payloads passed through the encrypted tunnel
Answer
Weak key exchange implementation allowing an attacker to precompute discrete logarithms and decrypt TLS session keys
The correct answer accurately identifies that 512-bit prime parameters in Diffie-Hellman key exchange are cryptographically broken. Utilizing sub-2048-bit prime groups dramatically reduces the computational effort required to solve discrete logarithms, enabling threat actors to compute session keys and decrypt TLS traffic.
Step-by-Step Solution
Key Concept
Cryptographic Key Exchange Weaknesses (Diffie-Hellman Parameter Strength)
Estimated Time:2m 0s