A retail chain is redesigning its store network architecture to satisfy payment card industry compliance requirements. Each store location operates on-site Point-of-Sale (POS) terminals connected to a shared local switch alongside store manager workstations and guest access points. To minimize audit scope and prevent lateral threat movement if a single terminal is compromised, POS terminals must be blocked from communicating directly with one another on the local switch while retaining full access to the router default gateway for transaction processing. Which network design control should the security engineer implement on the local switch?
- Private VLANs (PVLANs) with POS terminals configured on isolated ports and the router connected to a promiscuous portAnswer
- BA physical air gap separating the local POS network switch completely from all upstream routers and central systems
- CA perimeter firewall configured to inspect and filter incoming internet traffic at the store WAN boundary
- DA deception honeypot deployed inline within the POS subnet to drop unauthorized intra-VLAN packets
Answer
Private VLANs (PVLANs) with POS terminals configured on isolated ports and the router connected to a promiscuous port
Private VLANs (PVLANs) provide Layer 2 isolation within the same IP subnet. Configuring POS terminal ports as isolated ports ensures that frames sent between POS terminals are blocked at the switch layer. Configuring the router connection on a promiscuous port enables all isolated ports to communicate upstream with the default gateway for transaction processing.
Step-by-Step Solution
Key Concept
Private VLAN (PVLAN) Microsegmentation
Estimated Time:1m 30s