Question

The following passages were adapted from academic texts discussing the theoretical foundations of intellectual property law.

Passage A
Intellectual property regimes, particularly copyright law, are traditionally justified through a utilitarian framework, which analyzes legal systems based on their capacity to promote the greatest good. From this perspective, the primary goal of copyright is not to reward authors for their labor or to recognize any inherent moral entitlement, but rather to maximize overall social welfare. Because literary, musical, and artistic works are public goods in the economic sense—specifically, they are non-rivalrous, meaning one person’s enjoyment of a text does not diminish another’s ability to enjoy it—unrestricted copying would theoretically drive the market price of such works down to the marginal cost of reproduction. Without the legal mechanism of copyright to prevent this rampant free-riding, creators would be entirely unable to recoup their initial, often substantial, investment of time and capital. This market failure would lead to a suboptimal, drastically reduced production of new cultural works. Thus, copyright serves as a necessary, albeit temporary, monopoly granted by the state to incentivize artistic and scientific production. The exclusive rights conferred upon the author are strictly an instrumental means to a broader societal end: ensuring a robust and continuous supply of creative works that enrich the public sphere. Once the optimal period required to incentivize the creator has lapsed, the statutory monopoly must dissolve, returning the work to the public domain where it can be freely utilized to generate further social benefit.

Passage B
While economic and utilitarian arguments frequently dominate contemporary academic discussions of intellectual property, the true jurisprudential foundation of copyright law rests on inherent moral rights derived from the act of creation itself. Rooted deeply in the natural rights tradition and Lockean theories of labor, this perspective asserts that individuals possess an innate ownership over themselves and, by logical extension, over the labor of their minds and bodies. When an author expends intellectual effort to synthesize abstract ideas into a tangible, original expression, they are inextricably mixing their personal labor with the intellectual commons, thereby acquiring a natural property right over the resulting work. This right is not a pragmatic, utilitarian concession granted by the state merely to stimulate cultural production; rather, it is a fundamental, pre-political recognition of the creator's autonomy, dignity, and personhood. From this deontological standpoint, state copyright law does not artificially invent an author's rights out of whole cloth, but instead formally codifies and protects moral rights that already exist intrinsically. While granting creators exclusive legal control over the reproduction and distribution of their works may indeed yield positive economic externalities—such as incidentally incentivizing further artistic innovation—these societal benefits are entirely secondary. The primary legal imperative is the strict ethical obligation to prevent the unjust appropriation of another's intellectual labor, ensuring that creators maintain sovereign dominion over the fruits of their mind regardless of the overarching impact on the broader economic welfare.

Based on the passages, match each statement regarding intellectual property to its appropriate classification.