Passage A
For decades, the guiding principle of antitrust enforcement has been the "consumer welfare" standard. Under this framework, the central question in evaluating a merger or monopolistic practice is whether it harms consumers, primarily through higher prices, reduced output, or stifled innovation. This economically grounded approach correctly recognizes that market concentration is not inherently pernicious. In many cases, large firms achieve economies of scale that allow them to deliver goods more efficiently than a fragmented market of small competitors. Antitrust law should not exist to shield inefficient competitors from the rigors of the market, nor should it be used as a blunt instrument for social engineering. As long as a dominant firm's conduct results in lower prices and better products, intervention is unwarranted.
Passage B
The current antitrust regime's myopic focus on "consumer welfare"—defined almost exclusively by short-term price effects—has allowed dangerous concentrations of private power to go unchecked. The original architects of antitrust legislation understood that excessive market concentration threatens not just economic fairness, but democratic institutions themselves. A firm might use predatory pricing to drive out rivals, offering consumers artificially low prices in the short term, only to establish an unassailable monopoly. By ignoring market structure and the vitality of independent businesses, the prevailing framework fails to address the harms that monopolies inflict on workers, suppliers, and communities. Antitrust enforcement must return to its structuralist roots, prioritizing decentralized markets and the dispersion of economic power over narrow calculations of price efficiency.
Match each of the following propositions (1-4) with the statement that best describes the respective stances of the authors of Passage A and Passage B.
- The primary metric for determining whether a business practice violates antitrust law should be its direct effect on the prices paid by consumers.Assented to by the author of Passage A; rejected by the author of Passage B.
- Antitrust laws should be actively utilized to prevent the concentration of private economic power in order to safeguard democratic structures.Rejected by the author of Passage A; assented to by the author of Passage B.
- Monopolistic behavior by dominant firms has the capacity to inflict tangible harm.Assented to by both authors.
- The historical framers of antitrust legislation designed the laws with the primary intention of maximizing short-term economic efficiency.Rejected by the author of Passage B; Passage A's stance cannot be inferred.