Passage A
For decades, antitrust enforcement has been unduly constrained by the "consumer welfare" standard, which evaluates market dominance almost exclusively through the lens of price effects and output. This narrow framework ignores the broader legislative intent behind foundational antitrust statutes, which were designed to disperse economic power and protect democratic institutions from being undermined by monopolistic behemoths. A market structure dominated by a few massive firms can stifle innovation and exert undue political influence, even if it temporarily delivers lower prices to consumers. Therefore, antitrust analysis must return to its structuralist roots, evaluating mergers and corporate conduct based on their potential to concentrate power, rather than relying solely on abstract economic models of efficiency.
Passage B
The shift toward the consumer welfare standard in antitrust law marked a necessary evolution from the subjective, unpredictable enforcement of the mid-twentieth century. Before this standard, regulators often punished efficient firms simply for being large, protecting less efficient competitors at the expense of the public. By focusing strictly on economic efficiency—specifically, whether corporate behavior harms consumers through higher prices or reduced quality—the consumer welfare standard provides courts with a rigorous, objective metric. Introducing vague, inherently political goals, such as the "dispersion of power," would abandon this rigor. It would transform antitrust law from a predictable economic tool into a subjective weapon for social engineering, ultimately chilling the fierce competition that drives economic growth.
Based on the passages, the authors of Passage A and Passage B disagree over whether a highly concentrated market structure can ever result in lower prices for consumers.
Answer: Answer