Question

The mid-nineteenth-century expansion of telegraphic communication posed unprecedented challenges for Anglo-American intellectual property jurisprudence, which had historically tethered copyright protections strictly to fixed, tangible print media. In evaluating how jurists and theorists responded to the rapid dissemination of uncopyrighted news dispatches, three prominent legal frameworks emerge.

Legal historian Arthur Thorne champions the emergence of the 'quasi-property' doctrine, arguing that judicial recognition of proprietary interests in time-sensitive dispatches was an essential pragmatic adaptation that rightfully protected newsgatherers from commercial piracy, even if the doctrine rested on precarious common-law foundations that frequently blurred the distinction between property rights and unfair competition. In contrast, legal theorist Elena Halpern defends the strict statutory formalist approach favored by contemporary orthodox judges. Halpern insists that dispatches containing purely factual information belonged squarely in the public domain immediately upon broadcast; however, this insistence reflects an unyielding rigidity that ignores the commercial realities of informational capital and fails to grapple with the economic paralysis that uninhibited free-riding threatened to produce. Finally, economic historian Marcus Vance proposes that private collective clearinghouses, modeled after nineteenth-century patent pools, could have resolved the telegraphic property dilemma without judicial intervention. Vance's proposal offers an intriguing theoretical mechanism, but it relies on an overly optimistic appraisal of inter-agency cooperation, underestimating the intense monopolistic rivalries that rendered voluntary cross-licensing virtually impossible in the 1870s.

Based on the passage, match each legal framework or historical perspective with the phrase that most accurately characterizes the author's attitude toward it.