Kaelen: By abandoning legislative history in favor of textualism, judges lose the only objective anchor for resolving statutory ambiguity. Consequently, they inevitably end up projecting their own policy preferences onto the text under the guise of finding a "plain meaning."
Loring: Legislative history is no objective anchor; it is a contradictory grab-bag that allows judges to justify any preferred outcome. Textualism, by contrast, restricts judges to the public meaning of the enacted words, providing the only real limit on judicial policymaking, even when texts are ambiguous.
Kaelen and Loring disagree over whether
- relying on legislative history provides a stronger constraint on judicial policymaking than does textualismAnswer
- Bambiguous statutes present a danger of judges projecting their personal policy preferences
- Ctextualism completely eliminates a judge's ability to engage in judicial policymaking
- Dthe textualist approach was developed with the explicit intention of allowing judges to mask their policy preferences
- Elegislative history frequently contains contradictory materials that fail to provide a single clear interpretation
Answer
The correct answer is the option stating that relying on legislative history provides a stronger constraint on judicial policymaking than does textualism.
This option accurately captures the central disagreement. Kaelen argues that legislative history is 'the only objective anchor,' meaning its use constrains judges better than textualism, which inevitably leads to projecting preferences. Loring argues the exact opposite: legislative history allows judges to 'justify any preferred outcome,' whereas textualism provides 'the only real limit on judicial policymaking.' Thus, Kaelen affirms this statement, and Loring denies it.
Step-by-Step Solution
Key Concept
Point at Issue - Identifying the exact proposition where two arguments logically collide, while avoiding shared premises or unstated assumptions.