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Question 761Question

Network device architecture is divided into distinct functional planes to handle traffic and protocol processing efficiently. Which of the following functions is handled exclusively by the control plane?

Show answer & explanation

Answer: Exchanging routing protocol update messages to populate the routing information base

Answer

Exchanging routing protocol update messages to populate the routing information base is a control plane function.
The correct answer identifies routing protocol message exchange (such as OSPF, BGP, or EIGRP updates) and routing table building as a control plane responsibility. The control plane is responsible for network intelligence, topology discovery, and determining path selection.

Step-by-Step Solution

1
Identify the primary responsibility of the control plane
The control plane makes decisions about how traffic should be routed by running routing protocols and maintaining the Routing Information Base (RIB).
Control plane processes run on the main CPU to establish network intelligence and topology awareness.
2
Differentiate control plane duties from data plane and management plane duties
Packet forwarding, FIB lookups, and TTL decrements belong to the data plane, while SSH/CLI user access belongs to the management plane.
Separating plane duties ensures packet forwarding hardware can operate at line rate without waiting for routing calculation updates.

Key Concept

Control Plane vs Data Plane Responsibilities
Estimated Time:45s
Question 762Question

A network administrator configures port security on access interface GigabitEthernet0/10 of a Cisco Catalyst switch using the command `switchport port-security mac-address sticky`. Over the next week, several workstations connect to the port, and their MAC addresses are dynamically added to the running configuration. Following an unscheduled power outage and switch reboot, the administrator discovers that the connected workstations are unable to gain access and port security sticky entries are missing from the configuration. What was the root cause of this issue?

Show answer & explanation

Answer: The administrator did not save the running configuration to the startup configuration after the sticky MAC addresses were learned.

Answer

The administrator did not save the running configuration to the startup configuration after the sticky MAC addresses were learned.
When port security is configured with the sticky keyword, dynamically learned MAC addresses are converted into static-like entries and placed directly into the running configuration in RAM. Because RAM is volatile memory, any dynamic sticky entries learned while the switch is operational will be completely lost upon a switch reboot unless the administrator manually executes `copy running-config startup-config` (or `write memory`) to copy the running configuration into non-volatile storage (NVRAM).

Step-by-Step Solution

1
Analyze how sticky MAC addressing operates in Cisco Port Security.
When `switchport port-security mac-address sticky` is configured, the switch dynamically learns MAC addresses and adds them to the active running configuration file (`running-config`) as static entries.
Understanding where learned sticky addresses are saved during active operation.
2
Evaluate memory persistence across switch reboots.
The `running-config` resides in volatile RAM. If the switch reboots before `copy running-config startup-config` or `write memory` is executed, any dynamically added sticky MAC lines in RAM are lost.
Determining why sticky MAC entries disappeared after the reboot.
3
Identify the required administrative action to preserve sticky MACs.
Saving the running configuration commits the dynamically learned sticky MAC lines to NVRAM (`startup-config`), ensuring persistence across power cycles.
Pinpointing the missing step causing the loss of network access.

Key Concept

Port Security Sticky MAC Address Persistence
Estimated Time:1m 15s
Question 763Question

A network administrator is creating an IPv4 extended Access Control List (ACL) on a Cisco IOS router to regulate traffic flowing from internal hosts to the DMZ subnet (172.16.1.0/24172.16.1.0/24). The ACL must enforce the following policy requirements in order of precedence:

1. Allow HTTP traffic from any host in the internal subnet (192.168.10.0/24192.168.10.0/24) to the web server at 172.16.1.50172.16.1.50.
2. Block all other IP traffic from host 192.168.10.15192.168.10.15 to the DMZ subnet (172.16.1.0/24172.16.1.0/24).
3. Allow all remaining IP traffic from the internal subnet (192.168.10.0/24192.168.10.0/24) to the DMZ subnet (172.16.1.0/24172.16.1.0/24).
4. Explicitly deny all other traffic.

Arrange the given ACL statements in the correct top-down execution order to achieve this security policy without unintended traffic drops.

Drag items to arrange them in the correct order

Show answer & explanation

Answer

The correct sequential order for the access list statements from top to bottom is: permit tcp 192.168.10.0 0.0.0.255 host 172.16.1.50 eq 80, followed by deny ip host 192.168.10.15 172.16.1.0 0.0.0.255, followed by permit ip 192.168.10.0 0.0.0.255 172.16.1.0 0.0.0.255, and ending with deny ip any any.
Cisco IPv4 Access Control Lists evaluate rules sequentially from top to bottom. Specific exceptions must precede broader policy rules. The rule permitting HTTP traffic from 192.168.10.0/24 to 172.16.1.50 must be placed first so HTTP requests from host 192.168.10.15 are allowed. Next, the statement denying all IP traffic from host 192.168.10.15 to the DMZ network must be placed to filter out non-HTTP traffic from that specific host. Third, the broader subnet permit statement allows other hosts on 192.168.10.0/24 to access the DMZ network. Finally, the explicit deny statement is placed at the bottom.

Step-by-Step Solution

1
Identify specific host and protocol exemptions.
HTTP traffic (TCP port 80) from host 192.168.10.15 to host 172.16.1.50 must be permitted.
Cisco ACLs process packets sequentially from top to bottom and stop at the first matching statement. If the host deny statement came first, HTTP traffic from 192.168.10.15 would be matched and dropped immediately.
2
Place specific deny statements for targeted hosts after specific permits but before general permits.
Position 'deny ip host 192.168.10.15 172.16.1.0 0.0.0.255' second.
This blocks any non-HTTP traffic from host 192.168.10.15 before reaching the general subnet permit rule.
3
Place general subnet-to-subnet permit statements.
Position 'permit ip 192.168.10.0 0.0.0.255 172.16.1.0 0.0.0.255' third.
This allows all remaining valid hosts on the 192.168.10.0/24 network to communicate with the DMZ network.
4
Add the explicit deny catch-all statement.
Position 'deny ip any any' fourth.
Completes the ACL structure and enforces standard explicit filtering at the end of the access list.

Key Concept

Access Control List Top-Down Sequential Processing and Rule Specificity
Question 764Question

Match each network operation or traffic flow to its corresponding architectural plane.

Click a left item, then click its matching right item

Items

Exchanging OSPF Link-State Advertisements (LSAs) and computing the shortest path
Performing ingress packet header inspection and ASIC-based switching
Establishing an encrypted SSH session to configure device interfaces

Matches

Show answer & explanation

Answer

Exchanging OSPF LSAs matches the Control Plane; Performing ASIC-based switching matches the Data Plane; Establishing an encrypted SSH session matches the Management Plane.
Network operations are separated into functional planes based on their purpose: the Control Plane handles routing logic and network state signaling (e.g., OSPF); the Data Plane processes and forwards transit user data via hardware (e.g., ASIC packet switching); and the Management Plane handles direct administrative interactions (e.g., SSH).

Step-by-Step Solution

1
Analyze OSPF neighbor interactions and path calculations.
Determined to be control traffic responsible for maintaining topology information.
Protocols that create and maintain routing tables operate within the Control Plane.
2
Analyze ASIC-based frame/packet switching.
Determined to be user payload handling performed directly in hardware forwarding tables.
Transit traffic forwarding decisions and encapsulation changes belong to the Data Plane.
3
Analyze device access via SSH.
Determined to be user-to-device management traffic.
Administrative access protocols used to control and configure network nodes belong to the Management Plane.

Key Concept

Functional Plane Separation (Control, Data, and Management Planes)
Question 765Question

A network administrator is implementing Layer 2 security controls on an access switch, configuring Port Security with sticky MAC address learning alongside DHCP Snooping on edge switch ports. Which two statements correctly describe the operational behavior of these features? (Select two.)

Select all that apply

Show answer & explanation

Answer: Dynamically learned sticky MAC addresses are added directly to the running configuration in RAM.; DHCP server response messages, such as DHCPOFFER and DHCPACK, are dropped when received on an untrusted port.

Answer

The correct answers state that dynamically learned sticky MAC addresses are appended to the running configuration in RAM, and that DHCP server messages (such as DHCPOFFER and DHCPACK) arriving on untrusted ports are dropped by DHCP Snooping.
When port security sticky learning is configured, learned MAC addresses are converted into static-like MAC entries directly in the running-config in active RAM. Additionally, DHCP Snooping enforces boundary security by designating access interfaces as untrusted by default, dropping any DHCP server messages (such as DHCPACK or DHCPOFFER) that attempt to enter an untrusted interface.

Step-by-Step Solution

1
Analyze Port Security sticky MAC behavior
Confirm that sticky MAC learning dynamically populates the running configuration in RAM, which requires a manual save to startup configuration to persist across reboots.
Sticky MAC addresses act as static entries in running-config, but RAM is volatile memory.
2
Analyze DHCP Snooping port trust rules
Confirm that untrusted ports are only permitted to send DHCP requests from clients, while server responses (DHCPACK, DHCPOFFER) are intercepted and dropped.
Untrusted ports represent client-facing links, preventing rogue DHCP servers from handing out invalid addresses.

Key Concept

Port Security Sticky MAC Persistence and DHCP Snooping Trust Verification
Question 766Question

An organization is updating its enterprise security standards for administrative access and infrastructure security. Match each security control or PKI concept on the left to its corresponding operational function on the right.

Click a left item, then click its matching right item

Items

Account Lockout Threshold
Possession Factor
Certificate Signing Request (CSR)
Certificate Revocation List (CRL)

Matches

Show answer & explanation

Answer

Account Lockout Threshold matches the control defining maximum failed attempts before disabling an account. Possession Factor matches identity verification using a physical or digital token. Certificate Signing Request (CSR) matches submitting a public key and identity info to a CA. Certificate Revocation List (CRL) matches the periodically published list of revoked certificate serial numbers.
The correct pairings accurately map security terms to their standard definitions. Account Lockout Threshold controls brute-force password attacks by disabling accounts after failed attempts. Possession Factor represents 'something you have' such as a TOTP token app. CSR represents the enrollment request payload sent to a CA containing the public key. CRL represents the list of invalidated certificate serial numbers published by a CA.

Step-by-Step Solution

1
Analyze the password policy control mechanism.
Identify that Account Lockout Threshold limits failed login attempts to protect administrative accounts from brute-force attacks.
Password security policies enforce lockout rules after a predefined number of incorrect password attempts.
2
Categorize the multi-factor authentication element.
Map Possession Factor to tangible or digital objects like TOTP hardware tokens or smartphone apps.
MFA requires factors from distinct categories: Knowledge (something you know), Possession (something you have), and Inherence (something you are).
3
Evaluate PKI certificate enrollment components.
Match Certificate Signing Request (CSR) to the payload containing identity info and public key sent to a CA.
Endpoints must generate a local keypair and send a CSR to a Certificate Authority to obtain an X.509 certificate.
4
Evaluate PKI certificate revocation mechanisms.
Match Certificate Revocation List (CRL) to the signed file listing revoked certificate serial numbers.
CAs publish CRLs so relying parties can verify whether a certificate was invalidated prior to its scheduled expiration.

Key Concept

Password Security Policies, Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) Factors, and Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Certificate Components
Question 767Question

Match each wireless security deployment mode or protocol with its primary cryptographic cipher suite or key exchange mechanism.

Click a left item, then click its matching right item

Items

WPA3-Personal
Standard WPA2-Enterprise
WPA3-Enterprise 192-bit Mode
Enhanced Open (OWE)

Matches

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Answer

WPA3-Personal matches Simultaneous Authentication of Equals (SAE) using the Dragonfly handshake; Standard WPA2-Enterprise matches AES-CCMP-128 encryption paired with 802.1X/EAP authentication; WPA3-Enterprise 192-bit Mode matches 256-bit AES-GCMP encryption with HMAC-SHA384 key derivation; Enhanced Open (OWE) matches Unauthenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange providing opportunistic encryption.
Each wireless protocol suite uses distinct cryptographic mechanisms: WPA3-Personal relies on SAE (Dragonfly key exchange) to prevent offline brute-force attacks; standard WPA2-Enterprise uses 802.1X/EAP with AES-CCMP-128 encryption; WPA3-Enterprise 192-bit mode upgrades encryption to 256-bit AES-GCMP and HMAC-SHA384; and Enhanced Open employs OWE with unauthenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange for open Wi-Fi protection.

Step-by-Step Solution

1
Analyze WPA3-Personal key management requirements
Identify that WPA3-Personal mandates SAE (Simultaneous Authentication of Equals), replacing static PSK to protect against offline passphrase cracking.
SAE performs a forward-secret Dragonfly handshake during initial association.
2
Analyze standard WPA2-Enterprise default specifications
Identify that WPA2-Enterprise standard deployments use 802.1X with EAP methods for identity verification combined with AES-CCMP-128 for symmetric payload encryption.
AES-CCMP-128 is the default mandatory cipher suite defined in the IEEE 802.11i standard for WPA2.
3
Evaluate high-security WPA3 Enterprise requirements
Identify that WPA3-Enterprise 192-bit security mode specifies 256-bit AES Galois/Counter Mode (GCMP-256) and HMAC-SHA384 key derivation.
The 192-bit security profile aligns with Commercial National Security Algorithm (CNSA) suite standards.
4
Examine open wireless network encryption standards
Identify that Enhanced Open utilizes RFC 8110 Opportunistic Wireless Encryption (OWE) via an unauthenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange.
OWE delivers pairwise encryption on guest or open SSIDs without requiring password authentication.

Key Concept

Wireless security standards (WPA2, WPA3, OWE) and their respective authentication, key exchange, and cipher mechanisms.
Question 768Question

A network engineer applies the following extended IPv4 access control list inbound on router interface GigabitEthernet0/0/0 to allow web administration access from an operations subnet (172.16.50.0/24172.16.50.0/24) to a database server (10.0.1.50/3210.0.1.50/32):

text
ip access-list extended ADMIN_TO_DB
permit tcp 172.16.50.0 0.0.0.255 host 10.0.1.50 eq 443

Immediately after applying the ACL, administrators report that HTTPS connections to 10.0.1.5010.0.1.50 work as expected, but SSH connections and ICMP echo requests (ping) from the operations subnet to 10.0.1.5010.0.1.50 fail. What is the root cause of this behavior?

Show answer & explanation

Answer: The implicit deny statement at the end of the ACL drops all IPv4 traffic that does not match an explicit permit entry.

Answer

The implicit deny statement at the end of the access control list automatically drops all unlisted IPv4 traffic, including SSH and ICMP.
Every Cisco IOS IPv4 Access Control List ends with an unwritten, invisible entry commonly referred to as the implicit deny clause ('deny ip any any'). Because the ACL contains only a single permit entry for TCP port 443, any non-matching packets—such as SSH (TCP port 22) or ICMP—are caught by this final implicit deny rule and dropped.

Step-by-Step Solution

1
Analyze the configured ACL statement.
The statement 'permit tcp 172.16.50.0 0.0.0.255 host 10.0.1.50 eq 443' explicitly permits only TCP traffic sourced from 172.16.50.0/24 destined to 10.0.1.50 on destination port 443 (HTTPS).
Extended ACLs check source IP, destination IP, protocol, and port numbers.
2
Evaluate how unlisted traffic (SSH on port 22 and ICMP) is processed.
SSH and ICMP packets do not match the single permit rule configured in the list.
ACL entries are processed sequentially from top to bottom.
3
Apply default Cisco IOS ACL termination logic.
Traffic that fails to match any explicit ACE reaches the end of the ACL and hits the implicit 'deny ip any any' rule, resulting in packet drops.
All Cisco IPv4 ACLs append an invisible deny-all statement at the bottom of the access list.

Key Concept

ACL Sequential Processing and Implicit Deny Behavior
Estimated Time:1m 15s
Question 769Question

An engineer is inspecting traffic processing on a core router during a network maintenance window. Which operation is handled directly within the data plane (forwarding plane) of the router?

Show answer & explanation

Answer: Decrementing the IP Time-to-Live (TTL) field and rewriting Layer 2 headers

Answer

Decrementing the IP Time-to-Live (TTL) field and rewriting Layer 2 headers
The data plane (forwarding plane) deals exclusively with forwarding user transit traffic across the network device. Operations performed on a per-packet basis—such as decrementing the IP TTL value, updating packet checksums, performing FIB lookups, and applying Layer 2 framing encapsulation—are executed directly in data plane hardware (ASICs).

Step-by-Step Solution

1
Identify the primary role of the data plane (forwarding plane).
The data plane is responsible for processing transit packets through fast-path hardware (ASICs and TCAM) using pre-populated forwarding tables.
Per-packet actions must take place at wire speed without involving the main system CPU.
2
Evaluate which listed operation occurs on every passing frame in hardware.
Modifying packet headers (such as decrementing the TTL), checking/recalculating IP checksums, looking up destination addresses in the Forwarding Information Base (FIB), and rewriting Layer 2 headers are core data plane tasks.
Routing protocol computations (RIB creation) and SSH management belong to the control plane and management plane respectively.

Key Concept

Data plane hardware forwarding operations vs. control plane routing intelligence
Estimated Time:45s
Question 770Question

An administrator configures the following IPv4 extended named access control list on a Cisco IOS router and applies it inbound on interface GigabitEthernet0/0/1:

text
ip access-list extended CORP_SEC
permit tcp 10.1.10.0 0.0.0.255 host 192.168.1.50 eq 22
permit tcp 10.1.10.0 0.0.0.255 192.168.2.0 0.0.0.255 eq 80
permit tcp 10.1.10.0 0.0.0.255 192.168.2.0 0.0.0.255 eq 443

Which two statements accurately describe how network traffic arriving on GigabitEthernet0/0/1 will be filtered by this access control list? (Select two options.)

Select all that apply

Show answer & explanation

Answer: ICMP echo requests from host 10.1.10.5 to host 192.168.1.50 are dropped due to the implicit deny at the end of the access list.; TCP traffic originating from host 10.1.10.20 destined to host 192.168.2.100 on port 443 is permitted through the interface.

Answer

ICMP echo requests from host 10.1.10.5 to host 192.168.1.50 are dropped due to the implicit deny at the end of the access list, and TCP traffic originating from host 10.1.10.20 destined to host 192.168.2.100 on port 443 is permitted through the interface.
The correct statements recognize both explicit matching criteria and the role of the implicit deny clause. First, ICMP packets from host 10.1.10.5 to host 192.168.1.50 are dropped because the ACL only permits TCP port 22 to that destination; unmatched ICMP packets trigger the invisible implicit deny at the end of the list. Second, TCP traffic from host 10.1.10.20 to host 192.168.2.100 on port 443 explicitly matches the third entry permitting 10.1.10.0/24 to 192.168.2.0/24 eq 443.

Step-by-Step Solution

1
Analyze line 1 of the ACL for SSH traffic to host 192.168.1.50
Line 1 permits TCP traffic from 10.1.10.0/24 to host 192.168.1.50 on port 22 (SSH). It does not permit ICMP traffic or SSH traffic to other subnets.
Extended ACL match criteria examine protocol type (TCP), source network (10.1.10.0/24), destination address (host 192.168.1.50), and destination port (22).
2
Analyze lines 2 and 3 of the ACL for HTTP/HTTPS traffic to subnet 192.168.2.0/24
Lines 2 and 3 permit TCP traffic from 10.1.10.0/24 to any host in 192.168.2.0/24 on ports 80 (HTTP) and 443 (HTTPS). Host 192.168.2.100 falls into 192.168.2.0/24, so HTTPS traffic to this host matches line 3 and is permitted.
The wildcard mask 0.0.0.255 on destination 192.168.2.0 specifies the entire /24 network range.
3
Evaluate unlisted traffic types against the end of the ACL
ICMP echo requests from 10.1.10.5 to 192.168.1.50 do not match TCP port 22, 80, or 443 rules. Unmatched traffic hits the unwritten 'deny ip any any' at the end of the ACL and is dropped.
Cisco IOS automatically appends an invisible implicit deny statement at the end of every access control list.

Key Concept

Extended IPv4 ACL sequential matching and implicit deny processing
Estimated Time:1m 30s
Question 771Question

A system administrator is configuring an authentication server to support 802.1X wireless client access across campus switch stacks. Which operational characteristic of RADIUS makes it the primary protocol choice for this network access scenario compared to TACACS+?

Show answer & explanation

Answer: It combines authentication and authorization into a single protocol process while encrypting only the user password.

Answer

RADIUS combines authentication and authorization into a single protocol exchange and encrypts only the password field, making it the industry standard for 802.1X network access control.
The correct answer accurately identifies key attributes of RADIUS: it combines authentication and authorization into a unified exchange and encrypts only the password attribute in the request body. This combined model is optimized for network access control applications like 802.1X.

Step-by-Step Solution

1
Analyze the scenario requirement
The requirement focuses on 802.1X network access control for wireless clients and switch ports.
802.1X architectures rely heavily on RADIUS because network access decisions (Authentication and Authorization) occur simultaneously upon connection.
2
Compare RADIUS functional mechanics with TACACS+
RADIUS operates via UDP (ports 1812/1813), combines authentication and authorization into single transactions, and encrypts only the password attribute.
TACACS+ uses TCP port 49, separates AAA processes independently (allowing per-command authorization for administrator CLI access), and encrypts the entire packet body.
3
Identify the correct option describing RADIUS behavior
Combining authentication and authorization while encrypting only the password is the defining operational behavior of RADIUS.
This functional pairing aligns directly with network access control standards like 802.1X.

Key Concept

RADIUS vs TACACS+ Protocol Architectural Differences
Question 772Question

A network administrator installs a new identity certificate on a Cisco IOS router to secure HTTPS management access. However, when administrative workstations attempt to connect to the router via HTTPS, their web browsers display a security warning stating that the certificate issuer is untrusted. The router's system clock is synchronized via NTP, and the certificate is within its valid date range. What is the root cause of this trust failure?

Show answer & explanation

Answer: The client workstations lack the root certificate of the issuing Certificate Authority in their trusted certificate store to validate the chain of trust.

Answer

The client workstations lack the root certificate of the issuing Certificate Authority in their trusted certificate store to validate the chain of trust.
For a client browser to trust a server's identity certificate, it must validate the certificate signature using the public key of the issuing Certificate Authority (CA). If the CA root certificate (or intermediate CA certificate) is missing from the client's trusted root certificate store, the browser cannot build a valid chain of trust and will display an untrusted certificate warning.

Step-by-Step Solution

1
Analyze the certificate validation failure symptom
Client browsers reject the router's identity certificate due to an untrusted issuer.
During a TLS handshake, the client verifies the digital signature on the server's certificate against known, trusted Certificate Authorities.
2
Evaluate PKI trust requirements
The client must possess the public key (root certificate) of the CA that signed the identity certificate.
Without the root CA certificate installed in the client's local trusted root store, the browser cannot build a valid chain of trust back to a trusted anchor.

Key Concept

Public Key Infrastructure Chain of Trust and Root CA Certificate Validation
Question 773Question

A network infrastructure team is selecting a centralized AAA protocol to secure administrative CLI access to enterprise switches. The security policy dictates that all communication between the network devices and the AAA server must have its entire packet payload encrypted, and the solution must support granular authorization for individual CLI commands. Which protocol satisfies these security requirements?

Show answer & explanation

Answer: TACACS+

Answer

TACACS+ meets both requirements by encrypting the full packet body and separating authorization from authentication to permit command-level control.
TACACS+ is a AAA protocol operating over TCP port 49. It encrypts the entire body of the packet (all payload data beyond the TACACS+ header) and separates AAA functions, making it ideal for network device administration where granular per-command authorization is required.

Step-by-Step Solution

1
Analyze the payload encryption requirement.
Full-packet payload encryption is required. TACACS+ encrypts the entire body of the packet, whereas RADIUS only encrypts the password attribute.
Security policy specifies full-packet encryption rather than selective field encryption.
2
Analyze the command authorization requirement.
Granular command-level authorization is required. TACACS+ separates authentication, authorization, and accounting, allowing individual command checks. RADIUS combines authentication and authorization into single attribute-value pairs.
Separation of AAA functions is necessary for per-command authorization.

Key Concept

TACACS+ vs RADIUS AAA protocol features and encryption mechanisms
Question 774Question

An administrator needs to restrict access on a Cisco IOS router so that only traffic from host 192.168.10.15192.168.10.15 can reach the internal web server at 10.1.1.5010.1.1.50 via HTTPS (TCP port 443443). All other traffic originating from the 192.168.10.0/24192.168.10.0/24 network destined to any location must be allowed. Which set of IPv4 access control list statements correctly satisfies these requirements?

Show answer & explanation

Answer: ip access-list extended SECURE_ACCESS
permit tcp host 192.168.10.15 host 10.1.1.50 eq 443
deny tcp 192.168.10.0 0.0.0.255 host 10.1.1.50 eq 443
permit ip 192.168.10.0 0.0.0.255 any

Answer

The extended IPv4 ACL configuration that permits HTTPS traffic from host 192.168.10.15, denies HTTPS traffic from the rest of the 192.168.10.0/24 subnet to host 10.1.1.50, and permits all remaining IPv4 traffic from 192.168.10.0/24.
The correct configuration uses an extended named ACL to specify protocol (TCP) and port numbers (443). By placing the specific host permit line before the broader subnet deny line, the router allows host 192.168.10.15 to connect via HTTPS while blocking other hosts in 192.168.10.0/24 from reaching the web server on port 443. Finally, the trailing permit entry ensures other general IP traffic from the subnet is not dropped by the implicit deny rule.

Step-by-Step Solution

1
Determine the ACL type required
Extended ACL is required because filtering is based on source address, destination address, and protocol/port (TCP 443).
Standard ACLs can only filter based on source IP address.
2
Order the ACL permit and deny rules from most specific to least specific
First permit host 192.168.10.15 to reach host 10.1.1.50 eq 443, then deny the subnet 192.168.10.0 0.0.0.255 to host 10.1.1.50 eq 443.
Cisco IOS processes ACL entries top-down; matching stops at the first matching entry.
3
Account for the implicit deny clause at the end of the ACL
Add an explicit permit rule 'permit ip 192.168.10.0 0.0.0.255 any'.
Without an explicit permit statement at the end, all other IP traffic from the subnet would be blocked by the invisible implicit deny entry.

Key Concept

Extended IPv4 Access Control Lists top-down processing and implicit deny behavior
Estimated Time:1m 30s
Question 775Question

An enterprise network policy mandates Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) for network administrators establishing SSH sessions to core infrastructure devices. The policy specifically requires combining a 'something you know' factor with a 'something you have' factor. Which authentication combination satisfies this policy requirement?

Show answer & explanation

Answer: A static passphrase and a one-time password (OTP) generated by a mobile authenticator app

Answer

Combining a static passphrase with an OTP generated by a mobile authenticator app satisfies the requirement because it pair a knowledge factor ('something you know') with a possession factor ('something you have').
Multi-Factor Authentication requires using authentication mechanisms from at least two distinct categories: Knowledge (something you know), Possession (something you have), or Inherence (something you are). A static passphrase is a knowledge factor because it relies on memorized secret data, while a mobile authenticator app OTP represents a possession factor because it relies on control of a specific registered physical device.

Step-by-Step Solution

1
Identify the MFA factor categories required by the security policy
The policy requires one knowledge factor ('something you know') and one possession factor ('something you have').
True MFA requires distinct factor categories to ensure that compromising one mechanism does not compromise the entire authentication process.
2
Categorize the candidate authentication methods presented in each option
A passphrase is knowledge; a mobile authenticator app tied to a physical device is possession. Passwords/PINs are dual knowledge. Hardware keys/smartcards are dual possession. Biometrics are dual inherence.
Classifying each mechanism into its respective MFA category reveals which pair spans two distinct requested categories.
3
Select the pair that combines a knowledge factor and a possession factor
The option combining a static passphrase with a mobile authenticator app OTP is correct.
It fulfills both required factor types.

Key Concept

Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) Categorization (Knowledge, Possession, Inherence)
Question 776Question

A network administrator is configuring Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) certificate services to secure administrative access and VPN connections on Cisco routers. Match each PKI component on the left with its correct operational description on the right.

Click a left item, then click its matching right item

Items

Certificate Signing Request (CSR)
Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)
Certificate Authority (CA)

Matches

Show answer & explanation

Answer

Certificate Signing Request (CSR) matches the encoded request block with the public key; Certificate Revocation List (CRL) matches the signed file containing serial numbers of invalidated certificates; Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) matches the real-time HTTP status checking protocol; Certificate Authority (CA) matches the trusted entity issuing signed certificates.
Each PKI component aligns with its specific role in the lifecycle of digital certificates: the CSR is the request payload created by an endpoint containing its public key; the CA is the trusted authority issuing certificates; the CRL is a published list of revoked serial numbers; and OCSP is an HTTP-based real-time certificate revocation protocol.

Step-by-Step Solution

1
Identify the creation and submission phase of PKI certificate enrollment.
The Certificate Signing Request (CSR) is the unsigned request file containing the public key and applicant identity details submitted to the CA.
Before a certificate can be issued, a key pair is generated locally and public details are placed in the CSR.
2
Identify the certificate issuing body.
The Certificate Authority (CA) is the trusted party that validates identity information and signs identity certificates using its private key.
The CA establishes trust by acting as the signing authority in the Public Key Infrastructure.
3
Distinguish between offline/periodic and online/real-time certificate revocation checks.
CRL refers to the periodically published file of revoked certificate serial numbers, while OCSP provides real-time revocation checking over HTTP.
CRLs require downloading full lists periodically, whereas OCSP queries the revocation status of individual certificates on demand.

Key Concept

Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) components and certificate validation mechanisms
Question 777Question

A network administrator needs to construct an IPv4 extended Access Control List (ACL) on a Cisco IOS router to enforce the following security policy for internal users in the 192.168.1.0/24192.168.1.0/24 network:

1. Host 192.168.1.50192.168.1.50 must be permitted SSH access to the administrative server at 10.0.0.1010.0.0.10.
2. All other TCP traffic from the 192.168.1.0/24192.168.1.0/24 subnet destined to server 10.0.0.1010.0.0.10 must be blocked.
3. All hosts in the 192.168.1.0/24192.168.1.0/24 subnet must be permitted web access (HTTP) to any destination server.
4. General ICMP traffic must be allowed from any source to any destination.

Arrange the ACL statements from top to bottom (first line to last line) in the correct sequential order to achieve this policy without unintentionally blocking desired traffic.

Drag items to arrange them in the correct order

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Answer

The statements must be ordered sequentially from most specific host entry to broader subnet rules: first permit SSH from host 192.168.1.50 to 10.0.0.10, second deny all TCP from 192.168.1.0/24 to 10.0.0.10, third permit HTTP (port 80) from 192.168.1.0/24 to any, and fourth permit ICMP from any to any.
Cisco IOS ACLs process entries sequentially from top to bottom. The correct order places the most specific host-level permit rule for SSH at line 1, followed by the specific TCP deny rule to server 10.0.0.10 at line 2. Line 3 permits HTTP to any destination (which correctly permits HTTP except to 10.0.0.10, which was already matched and denied at line 2). Line 4 permits ICMP traffic before the implicit deny ip any any statement drops all remaining traffic.

Step-by-Step Solution

1
Identify the most specific exception rule.
Host 192.168.1.50 requires SSH access (TCP port 22) to host 10.0.0.10. Cisco ACLs evaluate top-down and stop at the first match. Therefore, 'permit tcp host 192.168.1.50 host 10.0.0.10 eq 22' must be the first line.
If a broader subnet deny statement were placed above this statement, host 192.168.1.50 would be blocked from establishing SSH sessions.
2
Identify the target subnet restriction rule.
All other TCP traffic from subnet 192.168.1.0/24 to host 10.0.0.10 must be blocked. The entry 'deny tcp 192.168.1.0 0.0.0.255 host 10.0.0.10' is placed second.
Placing this rule second ensures host 192.168.1.50 is permitted SSH access while all other TCP attempts to server 10.0.0.10 are dropped.
3
Place broader service permit rules after destination-specific deny rules.
The requirement states that all other HTTP traffic from 192.168.1.0/24 to any destination must be permitted, except HTTP to 10.0.0.10 which is covered under step 2. Placing 'permit tcp 192.168.1.0 0.0.0.255 any eq 80' third ensures HTTP to 10.0.0.10 is blocked while HTTP to all other hosts is permitted.
If the general HTTP permit rule were placed before the TCP deny rule for 10.0.0.10, HTTP traffic to 10.0.0.10 would match the permit rule and bypass security policy #2.
4
Place general IP protocol permit rules.
Place 'permit icmp any any' fourth. Unmatched traffic will hit the implicit 'deny ip any any' at the bottom of the ACL.
ICMP traffic needs explicit permission before the implicit deny clause drops all unreferenced packets.

Key Concept

Cisco IOS ACL Top-Down Sequential Evaluation Logic and Specific-to-General Ordering
Estimated Time:1m 30s
Question 778Question

A network security administrator is configuring centralized security management for enterprise switches and routers. Match each AAA pillar or protocol characteristic on the left with its correct operational description on the right.

Click a left item, then click its matching right item

Items

Authentication
Authorization
Accounting
TACACS+ Security Architecture

Matches

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Answer

Authentication matches with verifying user credentials. Authorization matches with defining allowed privileges and commands. Accounting matches with logging user activity and session details. TACACS+ Security Architecture matches with encrypting the full payload and separating AAA functions over TCP port 49.
Authentication verifies credentials (who you are), Authorization controls permitted actions/commands (what you can do), Accounting logs user session details (what you did), and TACACS+ architecture relies on TCP port 49 while providing full-packet payload encryption and modular separation of AAA functions.

Step-by-Step Solution

1
Identify the core definition of Authentication
Authentication answers 'Who are you?' by verifying credentials such as usernames and passwords.
Establishing identity is the primary first step in the AAA framework.
2
Identify the core definition of Authorization
Authorization answers 'What can you do?' by defining permitted command levels and access rights.
Once identity is proven, permissions must be enforced per user role.
3
Identify the core definition of Accounting
Accounting answers 'What did you do?' by tracking session start/stop times and commands executed.
Auditing requires keeping log records of user actions.
4
Identify the architectural mechanics of TACACS+
TACACS+ decouples AAA operations and uses TCP port 49 with full-packet payload encryption.
Unlike RADIUS which combines authentication/authorization and encrypts passwords only, TACACS+ provides total payload encryption and modular AAA separation.

Key Concept

AAA Framework Pillars and TACACS+ Protocol Architecture
Question 779Question

A network administrator configures an IPv4 extended named Access Control List (ACL) on a Cisco router interface to restrict incoming traffic as follows:

text
ip access-list extended FILTER_MGMT
permit tcp 10.2.20.0 0.0.0.255 host 172.16.100.5 eq 443
permit tcp host 10.2.20.12 host 172.16.100.5 eq 22

A technician attempts to troubleshoot network connectivity by issuing a `ping` command from host 10.2.20.2510.2.20.25 to server 172.16.100.5172.16.100.5, but all ICMP echo request packets are dropped. Which statement correctly explains why the ping traffic fails?

Show answer & explanation

Answer: The ACL ends with an invisible implicit deny statement that drops any traffic that does not match an explicit permit entry.

Answer

The ping traffic fails because all IPv4 ACLs end with an implicit deny statement that drops any traffic not matching an explicit permit rule.
In Cisco IOS IPv4 Access Control Lists (both Standard and Extended), processing occurs sequentially from top to bottom. If a packet does not match any explicit permit statement, it hits the unwritten implicit deny clause (`deny ip any any`) at the end of the ACL. Since the ACL only contains explicit permits for TCP HTTPS and SSH traffic, ICMP echo requests from host 10.2.20.2510.2.20.25 fall through to the implicit deny and are dropped.

Step-by-Step Solution

1
Analyze the configured ACL entries sequentially.
Line 1 permits TCP port 443 traffic from subnet 10.2.20.0/24. Line 2 permits TCP port 22 traffic from host 10.2.20.12.
Sequential top-down matching occurs for incoming packets.
2
Evaluate ICMP traffic from host 10.2.20.25 against the ACL lines.
ICMP packets do not match TCP port 443 or TCP port 22.
ICMP is a Layer 3 protocol distinct from TCP.
3
Apply final ACL processing logic.
The packet falls through to the unwritten `deny ip any any` rule at the bottom of the list and is dropped.
Every Cisco IOS IPv4 access control list concludes with an implicit deny all clause.

Key Concept

ACL Sequential Processing and Implicit Deny Clause
Question 780Question

An enterprise network policy mandates strict access controls for network engineers managing edge routers. The policy requires that user identity verification and command execution permission checks operate as completely decoupled processes, allowing individual CLI commands to be evaluated independently by a central server after a session is established. Which operational characteristic of TACACS+ satisfies this requirement?

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Answer: Complete separation of authentication, authorization, and accounting functions into distinct, modular transactions

Answer

TACACS+ architecture fully decouples authentication, authorization, and accounting, which enables per-command authorization checks during an established administrative session over reliable TCP port 49.
TACACS+ separates authentication, authorization, and accounting into distinct functional processes and uses TCP port 49 for reliable transport. This modular separation enables network devices to send independent authorization requests for individual CLI commands executed during an active administrative session.

Step-by-Step Solution

1
Analyze the policy requirements
The scenario requires decoupled authentication and authorization services to perform per-command authorization checks.
Administrative device access requires fine-grained control over which specific CLI commands a user can run.
2
Compare TACACS+ and RADIUS functional separation mechanics
TACACS+ separates AAA services into modular transactions over TCP port 49, whereas RADIUS combines authentication and authorization into unified transactions over UDP.
Modular functional separation allows a device to request authorization decisions for individual commands without re-authenticating.

Key Concept

TACACS+ vs. RADIUS Functional Architecture (Decoupled AAA vs. Combined Auth/Author)
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