Question

Historically, the formation of Customary International Law (CIL) was understood as a glacial process. Traditionalist legal scholars maintain that a binding custom emerges only when two strict criteria are met: uniform, long-standing state practice (*usus*) and the psychological conviction that such practice is legally mandated (*opinio juris*). For these scholars, state action must precede the legal norm; words alone are insufficient. However, the modern proliferation of multilateral treaties and UN General Assembly resolutions has spurred the rise of what some term "instant custom." Modernists argue that overwhelming consensus in international forums can instantly generate binding CIL, even in the absence of preceding historical practice. This approach is highly practical for addressing rapidly evolving domains like environmental protection or cyber warfare, where waiting decades for consistent state practice could prove catastrophic. Yet, traditionalists view this modern approach with deep suspicion, arguing that it essentially conflates political aspiration with binding legal obligation, thereby bypassing the sovereign consent that has historically anchored international law.

Based on the passage, the traditionalist legal scholars would be most likely to agree with which one of the following statements regarding a unanimously adopted UN General Assembly resolution declaring the weaponization of artificial intelligence to be a violation of Customary International Law?